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1. Introduction 
 
This report presents the doctoral research done during the first year of the PhD study. The 
research is concerned with the analysis of the outcomes of electricity market reforms that 
have been put into practice in more than half of the countries in the world (see Section 3). The 
analysis is predominantly empirical with a special focus on electricity industries. Originally, 
this research was inspired by the experiences of the author, who was working for the energy 
market regulator in his home country before commencing his PhD studies in Cambridge. The 
final PhD thesis will be in three-paper format. Although it has not been fully completed yet 
and is still in progress, the first paper and preliminary results from it are presented in this 
report. We also briefly mention subsequent papers here; however, their final structure will be 
determined in the following years of the PhD study. 
 
Electricity is an indispensable good for households and a key input for industry in almost 
every economy. Its importance is so obvious that we do not need to spend further time to 
explain it. Since 1980s, vast amounts of financial resources and effort have been spent on 
reforming electricity industries in both developed and developing countries. Reforms were 
pioneered by Chile, the UK, and Norway; and have spread all over the world. In almost all 
reforming countries, electricity reform has been a part of wider policies towards a liberal 
market economy. In the process of reform, the former vertically integrated electricity utilities 
were restructured and unbundled, and competition has been introduced into generation, 
wholesale and retail segments of the industry. Transmission and distribution businesses have 
usually remained as regional or national monopolies but they have been put under regulation 
by an independent sector regulator. Other common elements of the reforms include 
introduction of wholesale and spot power markets, establishment of impartial market and 
system operators, removal of restrictions on third party access to networks and, in some cases, 
privatization.  
 
The motivations for changing the power industry structure vary from country to country, but 
in general, it is expected that successful reforms can improve the efficiency of the sector and 
offer lower price-cost margins and better quality of service. In developing countries, an 
additional objective may be added as attracting investment into the power sector (Sioshansi, 
2006b).  
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Three decades have elapsed since the introduction of first reforms and there is now a need for 
a detailed evaluation on the economic impact of the reforms because the reforms appear to be 
costly and there seems to be a growing controversy about their benefits. It is, therefore, 
important to examine whether evidence supports and verifies the logic of reforms, as 
suggested in Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) and Pollitt (2009a, 2009b, 2008b). A number of 
empirical studies have tried to measure the impact of regulatory reforms in a variety of ways 
but they have mostly failed to provide a macro perspective as most of them focused on a 
single country or a few countries, as reviewed in Mota (2004) and Pollitt (2009b). Only a 
small number of scholars have made a contribution in conducting cross-country analysis of 
the impact of regulatory reforms in the electricity industries. Even in these studies, analyses 
were conducted using very limited data and the number of countries analyzed was quite small. 
So, there is a huge research gap in this very important area. Using a panel data on 92 countries 
covering whole reform period so far (1982-2009), this study attempts to fill this gap to a 
certain degree. Besides, to the best of our knowledge, present study will be the most extensive 
one in terms of both scale and scope. 
 
To summarize, the proposed PhD thesis will consist of three independent but related papers 
where the preliminary results from the first one are presented in this report. The expected 
contributions of these papers are the following. The first paper focuses on the impact of the 
power market reforms on the convergence of residential and industrial electricity price-cost 
margins in various countries towards their average value and on cross-subsidy levels between 
consumer groups. In almost all reforming countries, one of the main targets of power market 
reforms has been price-cost margins. By introducing cost-reflective pricing, improving 
efficiency (and, thereby, reducing costs) in the sector; the reforms are expected not only to 
make electricity price-cost margins in different countries converge towards their average but 
also to reduce cross-subsidy levels between consumer groups in both developed and 
developing countries. The first paper questions these expectations and checks whether 
reforms really cause electricity price-cost margins to move towards the average value and 
cross-subsidy levels to go down. Second paper will deal with other objectives of the reform 
process, especially quality of service, efficiency and investment issues. The last paper is 
planned to focus on the institutional and qualitative aspects of the reform process and try to 
find out why reforms are successful in some countries while they fail in others. 
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The report is structured as follows. Following section presents literature review and the 
reform experience so far. This section summarizes the studies using econometric methods to 
analyze electricity market reforms and mentions country experiences to give the reader a 
flavour of what has been done so far. However, an extensive account of the reform process is 
both not an objective of this paper and well outside its scope. Section 3 describes the research 
gap, research questions and data collection issues. Section 4 presents the first paper, titled 
“The impact of power market reforms on convergence towards the average price-cost margin: 
a cross country panel data analysis”. Subsequent section briefly mentions the second and 
third papers and outlines PhD research plan. Final section concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and the evidence so far 
 
2.1. Studies using econometric methods to analyze electricity market reforms 
 
Jamasb et al. (2004) classify approaches to analysing electricity reforms into three broad 
categories: (i) econometric methods, (ii) efficiency and productivity analysis methods, and 
(iii) individual or comparative case studies. They argue that econometric studies are best 
suited to the analysis of well-defined issues and the testing of hypotheses through statistical 
analysis of reform determinants and performance. According to them, efficiency and 
productivity analyses are suitable for measuring the effectiveness with which inputs are 
transformed into outputs, relative to best practice. Jamasb et al. (2004) also maintain that 
single or multi-country case studies are suitable when in-depth investigation or qualitative 
analysis is needed. Within this classification, our study well suits the first category. Therefore, 
in this section we summarize econometric studies that focus on cross-country evidence on the 
impact of electricity market reforms. Non-econometric studies, econometric studies looking at 
just one or a few countries and studies that are not directly related to electricity markets are 
outside the scope of this section. 
 
The empirical analysis by Steiner (2001) constitutes one of the earliest analysis of the reform 
process. Steiner (2001) looked at the effect of regulatory reforms on the retail prices for large 
industrial customers as well as the ratio of industrial price to residential price, using panel 
data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1986-1996. In her study, Steiner (2001) carried out 
a panel data analysis including electricity price, ratio of industrial to residential electricity 
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price, capacity utilization rate and reserve margin. Using these variables, she tried to measure 
the competitive aspects and the cost efficiency of reform. She also looked at some reform 
elements separately, including unbundling, wholesale power pool, third party access to 
transmission and privatization. The study found that electricity market reforms generally 
induced a decline in the industrial price and an increase in the price differential between 
industrial customers and residential customers, indicating that industrial customers benefit 
more from the reform. She also found that unbundling is not associated with lower prices but 
is associated with a lower industrial to residential price ratio and higher capacity utilization 
rates and lower reserve margins. 
 
Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) tested two hypotheses in their study. The first one was that 
country policy and institutions are positively correlated with reform, and second was that 
country risk is negatively correlated with reform. Their results supported both hypotheses. 
The coefficient on the policy indicator and the coefficient on the risk indicator were 
significant and had the expected signs. In addition, they detected some regional effects. For 
instance, they found that Latin American and Caribbean countries are more likely to reform 
while countries in the Middle East and Africa are more likely to take fewer reform steps. 
 
The study by Ruffin (2003) dealt with the institutional determinants of competition, 
ownership and extent of reform in electricity reform process. The institutional determinants 
employed are different measures of judicial independence, distributional conflict and 
economic ideology. The study used a cross-section OLS regression analysis of a set of models 
with observations of up to 75 developed and developing countries that reformed their 
electricity industries during the 1990s. Ruffin (2003) also used institutional explanatory 
variables with the electricity reform scores that reflect the extent of reform. The study found 
that the relation between judicial independence on the one hand, and competition and 
ownership on the other, is ambiguous; i.e. the coefficients are often insignificant or, when 
significant, their sign shifts across models. Besides, greater distributional conflict was found 
to be significantly correlated with a higher degree of monopoly. Moreover, the results showed 
that the relation between economic ideology favouring competition and private ownership 
was generally positive and significant. The results also pointed out that there is a positive 
relationship between judicial independence and reform scores. Furthermore, economic 
ideology showed a positive and mostly significant relation with the reform score in this study. 
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Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) examined the impact of the regulatory reforms on prices in the 
electricity industry. Like Steiner (2001), they also used panel data for 19 OECD countries but 
for the period 1987-1999. Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) found that, first, expanded retail access 
is likely to lower the industrial price, while at the same time increasing the price differential 
between industrial and household customers. Second, they concluded that the unbundling of 
generation did not necessarily lower the price and may have possibly resulted in higher prices. 
Like Steiner (2001), their estimation showed that the effect of unbundling on the level of 
industrial price is statistically insignificant. Besides, they found that the introduction of a 
wholesale power market did not necessarily lower the price, and may indeed had resulted in a 
higher price. Their estimates showed, without exception, that establishing a wholesale power 
market resulted in statistically significant higher prices and also increased the ratio of 
industrial price to household price, although not in a statistically significant manner. Finally, 
they detected that a large share of private ownership lowers the industrial price but may not 
alter the price ratio between industrial and household customers. Their finding that 
unbundling of generation and the introduction of a wholesale spot market have resulted in a 
higher price is not consistent with expectations and differs from Steiner (2001). 
 
Zhang et al. (2005) concentrated on the sequencing of competition, regulation and 
privatisation in reform processes in developing countries. They studied the effect of the 
sequencing of privatisation, competition and regulation reforms in electricity generation using 
data from 25 developing countries for the period 1985-2001. They used a fixed effects panel 
data model. They found that establishing an independent regulatory authority and introducing 
competition before privatisation is correlated with higher electricity generation, higher 
generation capacity and, in the case of the sequence of competition before privatisation, 
improved capital utilisation. 
 
Pollitt (2009b) mentions two other empirical studies that examine the price impacts of reform 
by Ernst & Young (2006) and Thomas (2006a). Ernst & Young (2006) prepared a report for 
the UK government’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In their study, they used a 
sample of EU-15 countries and tried to produce some policy suggestions for electricity and 
gas industries with a large number of simple regressions. As a result of their study, they 
concluded that liberalization lowers prices; liberalization lowers costs and price-cost margins; 
liberalized markets increase price volatility; liberalization inhibits investment; liberalized 
markets provide reliable and secure supply; and liberalized markets interact effectively with 
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other public policies (such as on climate change). Thomas (2006a) examined a number of 
reports including those of European Commission which look at (or comment on) electricity 
prices. He argued although these studies suggest that reforms in the EU have been associated 
with lower prices for consumers, the evidence does not support these assertions. The price 
reductions, he continued, that have occurred in the past decade took place mostly in the period 
1995-2000, before liberalization was effective in most of the European Union and since then, 
prices have risen steeply, in many cases wiping out the gains of the earlier period. For him, 
other factors, not properly accounted for, such as fossil fuel price movements, technological 
innovations and changes to regulatory practices were more likely to have led to the price 
reductions that occurred in the period 1995-2000 than reforms that had not then taken effect. 
He also underlined that the EU reform model’s real test is whether it can deliver timely 
investment to meet the emerging investment gap following the elimination of short run 
inefficiency and initially high reserve margins. 
 
Fiorio et al. (2007) questioned the widespread believes that public ownership can be an 
impediment to other reforms and that it leads to production inefficiency. To test for this and 
the reform paradigm in general, they considered electricity prices and survey data on 
consumer satisfaction in the EU-15. Their empirical findings rejected the prediction that 
privatization leads to lower prices, or to increased consumer satisfaction. They also found that 
country specific features tend to have a high explanatory power, and the progress toward the 
reform paradigm is not systematically associated with lower prices and higher consumer 
satisfaction. 
 
Zhang et al. (2008) provided an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization, 
competition and regulation on the performance of the electricity generation industry using 
panel data for 36 developing and transitional countries over the period 1985-2003. The study 
identified the impact of these reforms on generating capacity, electricity generated, labour 
productivity in the generating sector and capacity utilization. The main conclusions were that 
on their own privatization and regulation (PR) do not lead to obvious gains in economic 
performance, though there are some positive interaction effects. By contrast, they concluded, 
introducing competition seemed to be effective in stimulating performance improvements. 
 
The most recent studies on econometric modelling of electricity market reforms were two 
papers by Nagayama (2009, 2007). Nagayama (2007) used panel data for 83 countries 
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covering the period 1985-2002 to examine how each policy instrument of the reform 
measures influenced electricity prices for countries in Latin America, the former Soviet 
Union, and Eastern Europe. The study found that variables such as entry of independent 
power producers (IPPs), unbundling of generation and transmission, establishment of a 
regulatory agency, and the introduction of a wholesale spot market have had a variety of 
impacts on electricity prices, some of which were not always consistent with expected results. 
The research findings suggested that neither unbundling nor introduction of a wholesale pool 
market on their own necessarily reduces the electricity prices. In fact, contrary to 
expectations, there was a tendency for the prices to rise. He argued, however, coexistent with 
an independent regulator, unbundling may work to reduce electricity prices. He also found 
that privatization, the introduction of foreign IPPs and retail competition lower electricity 
prices in some regions, but not in all of them. In his second paper, Nagayama (2009) aimed at 
clarifying whether the effects of electric power sector reforms should be different either 
across regions, or between developing and developed countries. He analyzed an empirical 
model to observe the impact of electric power prices on the selection of a liberalization model 
in the power sector. This was achieved by the use of an ordered response, fixed effect and a 
random effect model. An instrument variable technique was also used to estimate the impact 
of the liberalization model on the electric power price. These econometric models were 
designed using panel data from 78 countries in four regions (developed countries, Asian 
developing countries, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and Latin America) for 
the period from 1985 to 2003. The research findings suggested that higher electricity prices 
are one of the driving forces for governments to adopt liberalization models, a finding also 
noted by Joskow (2008), in the context of the US. However, the development of liberalization 
models in the power sector does not necessarily reduce electricity prices. In fact, contrary to 
expectations, the study found that there was a tendency for the prices to rise in every market 
model. 
 
Based on this brief literature review on cross-country econometric studies related to electricity 
market reforms, we may argue that present econometric evidence on the impact of the reform 
process is quite limited and will take more time to emerge. Therefore there exists a huge 
research gap in this area. Besides, we believe that panel datasets rather than simple cross-
section models should be used in future studies, preferably including pre- and post-reform 
data. When dealing with extensive samples including observations from various developed 
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and developing countries over long time periods, country and time effects should also be 
taken into account in regressions. 
 
2.2. Country experiences on electricity market reforms 
 
Today, in most of the European countries, US, Canada, Australia and some selected countries 
in Latin America, power sector reforms are already highly developed. On the other hand, 
countries in Africa and the Middle East have been late in implementing reforms and reforms 
have been gradually taking effect in Eastern Europe and Asia. This section briefly reviews the 
country experiences so far. Due to limitations on the length of the report, we could not 
provide an extensive account of the reform processes around the world, and therefore, our 
focus will be on countries that have introduced wide-ranging reform measures and on those 
with novel characteristics that are important for explaining reform process. 
 
2.2.1. Electricity market reforms in Central and South America 
 
The privatization and liberalization of the electricity sector in Latin America has progressed to 
the point where a competitive market has been established in such countries as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, and El Salvador (Nagayama, 2007). However, state owned vertically 
integrated electricity utilities are still dominant in other parts of the region (e.g. Venezuela 
and Mexico). Electricity reforms in Chile and Argentina were the deepest and the most 
radical. In Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, electricity markets were restructured and opened to 
competition. Reforms in Brazil were more cautious and gradual (Gabriele, 2004). Most of the 
countries of the region have followed the Chilean model (Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina in the 
first stage), but Colombia followed the approach initially adopted in England and Wales 
(Hammons, 2003). In this sub-section, we will cover reforms in Chile, Argentina and Brazil; 
and briefly mention those in Bolivia and Peru. 
 
Chile was the first country in the world that introduced reforms in its power industry. The 
electricity power law was enacted and a wholesale market was created in 1982. The state-
owned electricity enterprise was privatised without its transmission systems being unbundled, 
leading to emergence of a private company with a virtual monopoly on the transmission 
sector. More specifically, new private company group (Endesa group) held a share of more 
than 90% in transmission network, controlled 80% of generating capacity and was the 
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distributor for 43% of all customers in Chile (Nagayama, 2007). So, one group controlled 
generation, transmission and distribution, giving it sufficient leverage to exert market power. 
Today, the Chilean power sector is comprised of 31 generating companies, 5 transmission 
companies, and 36 distribution utilities, most of which are privately owned. Power generation 
and transmission operations have been liberalised, allowing free entry to and withdrawal from 
these businesses. Since no restrictions are imposed on foreign capital companies, numerous 
businesses have entered the market (Nagayama and Kashiwagi, 2007). As expected, the 
biggest challenges in Chile’s power sector are issues related to reducing market power and 
promoting competition. The problems originated from the fact that a pool market model was 
adopted when there were a few big generation companies with market power. The inadequate 
unbundling of the generation and transmission sectors resulted in the transmission company 
being owned by a specific generation company, which worsened the situation. Finally, as 
result of an acute electricity crisis caused by a collapse of hydro output in 1998-1999 and 
ahead of an election, Chilean government intervened in the functioning of the market and 
assumed a greater decision making role in strategic investment and regulation. 
 
Pollitt (2004) assessed the progress in Chilean reforms and its lessons. He found that the 
reform was very successful. He concluded that while the initial market structure and 
regulatory arrangements gave rise to certain problems, the overall experience argued strongly 
for the private ownership and operation of the electricity industry, with appropriate 
restructuring to create a competitive market. 
 
Argentina was also one of the first countries in the world to implement an electricity market 
reform. Besides, market reform in Argentina has been regarded as one of the most successful 
ones as it achieved significant reductions in system losses and improvements in quality of 
supply (Haselip and Potter, 2010). The Argentine power sector reform was design based on 
the lessons learned from privatisation and reforms in Chile and the United Kingdom. 
Especially, full-scale unbundling in Argentina was in response to the problems that had been 
experienced in Chile, where insufficient unbundling and limitations on competition had 
damaged reforms. The electricity sector in Argentina was considerably restructured in 1992 as 
part of the reorganisation and privatisation programme. That is, the power sector reform was 
performed as part of the wider structural changes in the overall Argentine economy. It was 
also an attempt to address the impending energy crisis. In reform process, more than 80% of 
the generation, all of the transmission and 60% of the distribution sector were transferred into 
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private ownership. Remaining public ownership was limited to the state owned nuclear power 
generating company and two hydro-electric plants (with part foreign ownership) in the 
generation sector and some provincially owned distribution companies (Pollitt, 2008a). The 
vertically integrated state owned company was restructured into 5 generation and 3 
distribution companies. A system operator (CAMMESA) was established with equal equity 
participation by all interested parties in the market except for small customers and generators. 
The generation market was very successful and the most competitive one probably in the 
world in the late 1990s. 
 
One rather novel aspect of reforms in Argentina is the arrangements for transmission 
expansion. With the reforms, transmission expansions in Argentina were no longer the 
responsibility of the transmission owner or regulator, but of the users of the transmission 
system. The public contest method required users to propose, approve and pay for major 
expansions. Approved expansions were then put out to competitive tender (Littlechild, 2008). 
 
Until the macroeconomic crisis of 2002, power sector reforms in Argentina proved successful. 
This is illustrated by the decrease in electricity tariffs and the improved investment situation 
for generators in the decade between reforms being implemented and the economic crisis 
(Nagayama and Kashiwagi, 2007). With the devaluation of the peso in 2002, retail prices for 
electricity were frozen, which stopped investments and caused generators and distribution 
companies to suffer from losses as they cannot pass-through price increases to customers. To 
balance the disequilibrium between demand and supply caused by the tariff freeze, the 
government pursued a policy of price controls, subsidies and demand-side management 
measures. So, the politicisation of tariff setting process resulted in the setting of electricity 
tariffs at a level at which cost recovery was not feasible, which interfered with the functioning 
of the market. 
 
Although after the crisis the achievements of the reforms were severely limited by the 
government’s poor energy policy and intervention into the market for political reasons; today 
the framework of liberalization is sustained and still functional in Argentina. Pollitt (2008a) 
draws two sets of lessons from Argentina’s electricity reforms for developing countries. First, 
comprehensive electricity reform can work in a developing country. Second, well organised 
markets and effective network regulation are undermined if there is unnecessary political 
interference in the pricing of electricity. 
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Brazil started to reform its power sector in 1995 with privatization of its major electricity 
utility (Eletrobras). IPPs were allowed to enter the Brazilian market and generation companies 
were privatized. Besides, a nationwide power grid operator and a wholesale electricity market 
were established. However, the vast complexity of the Brazilian electricity industry, 
incompletely defined regulatory structure; a lack of effective planning and an unstable 
economy hindered the flow of investments necessary to guarantee the system’s expansion. As 
a result, the Brazil experienced a rationing of electrical energy that lasted from June 2001 to 
February 2002 (De Souza and Legey, 2010). The 2001 crisis vividly demonstrated Brazil’s 
vulnerability to drought due to an excessive dependence on hydro-power and its low reserve 
margins (Lock, 2005). In response to this crisis, after 2004, Brazil shifted its electricity policy 
to emphasize long-term stability instead of free market. Brazilian government established a 
new regulatory framework for electricity. This new framework has three broad objectives: (1) 
to create an efficient mechanism for the contracting of electricity on behalf of captive 
consumers; (2) to ensure security of supply at the lowest possible prices; and (3) to provide 
universal access to electricity to consumers around the country (Dutra and Menezes, 2005). 
The 2004 revision introduced new practices in Brazilian power market. To begin with, two 
distinct contract environments are defined. The first environment is the regulated contracting 
environment (ACR) and second one is free contracting environment (ACL). The former has 
the purpose of protecting captive (small) consumers, while the latter allows for “free” (large) 
customers to choose their electricity suppliers. Within the ACR, a distinction is made between 
“new” and “existing” electricity. The aim is for final consumers to pay a combination of a 
higher price associated with new plants and a lower price associated with existing, partially, 
or fully depreciated plants. In this contracting environment, distributors are required to 
contract their entire forecast demand for captive consumers with generators, importers, and 
retailers. Contracts will be auctioned off over time with different auctions for new and 
existing electricity under a lowest-tariff criterion. Other new practices included the 
revitalization of mid- and long-term planning, the introduction of long-term agreements to 
guarantee the return of investments in new plants, and the uncoupling of distribution services 
from any other activities. 
 
Mota (2003) conducted a study on the social welfare impacts of the privatization process in 
Brazilian distribution and supply markets during 1995-2000 period. The study adopted a 
social cost-benefit methodology and found that net benefits were significant, but producers 
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absorbed most of the net gains. The paper concluded that had regulation been tougher since 
the beginning, consumers could have benefited more from privatisation. In another study by 
Mota (2004), a representative sample of privatised Brazilian companies is benchmarked 
against comparable United States investor-owned utilities. The study found that the efficiency 
gap among Brazilian and the US companies had been closing since privatisation. Even, the 
analysis of efficiency scores showed that Brazilian companies outperform their US 
counterparts, that is, Brazilian companies have on average higher efficiency scores than US 
utilities for almost all model specifications and for both 1994 and 2000. Overall, the study 
suggested that reforming distribution and supply can bring substantial benefits for developing 
countries, especially when both privatisation and incentive-based regulation are introduced. 
The results also provided support for the role of regulation in ensuring adequate capacity 
expansion, lower system losses, and the transfer of productivity gains to consumers.  
 
Bolivia’s electricity reforms occurred in the context of a debt crisis. Electricity reform was a 
component of wider economic reform. Even before reform, generation and distribution were 
already partly unbundled with diverse ownership. However, vertically integrated state utility 
(ENDE) controlled 80% of generation and operated the grid. The power sector in general and 
ENDE in particular provided satisfactory service, operated efficiently with relatively low 
system loses and were profitable at the time of reforms as tariffs were set above cost recovery 
levels. In 1994, the sector was fully unbundled. ENDE was turned into three private 
generation companies and a private transmission company. Privatization of the sector was 
completed by 1998. A wholesale market was created and consisted of regulated contracts 
supplemented by a competitive spot market, with distribution utilities required to buy 80% of 
expected demand on 3-year contracts. These arrangements have so far resulted in significant 
investment in expansion and upgrades. The World Bank closely involved in Bolivia’s 
electricity reform and considered it a success in terms of sector finance and operations, and 
the government’s fiscal goals (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006).  
 
Peru also implemented neo-liberal market reforms in the electricity sector in the early 1990s, 
as part of a broader economic restructuring and in response to a crisis in its electricity system 
from 1986 to 1990 (Pérez-Reyes and Tovar, 2009). In 1990, the electricity rates were 
increased and sate electricity utility (Electro Peru) was restructured. Moreover, several state-
owned companies were privatized but a significant important group of privatized companies 
were renationalized in 2002. The reforms were an attempt to attract private capital to finance 
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the expansion of the power supply mainly in the generation sector. As a result of reforms, 
electrification levels increased from 45 percent in 1992 to 75 percent by 2002. Service quality 
also improved markedly (Cherni and Preston, 2007). 
 
Anaya (2010) performed a study to assess the social welfare impact of the restructuring and 
privatisation of the electricity market in Peru. Two target companies in the study accounted 
for 64% of the total distribution market and 100% of the privatised distribution companies. 
She examined actual and counterfactual operating costs and performed a separate analysis for 
each company due to the differences in terms of economies of scale and market structure. She 
also computed the benefits from being connected on counterfactual scenarios. She used non-
privatized companies (benchmark companies) for making appropriate comparisons and for 
determining preferred counterfactual cost decline. The study results showed that privatisation 
was worthwhile and that the social welfare of being connected had an important contribution 
to it. She concluded that government and producers benefited the most and consumers the 
least due to price increases. 
 
2.2.2. Electricity market reforms in Europe 
 
Traditionally, electricity utilities were vertically integrated in many European countries, with 
state or municipally owned enterprises playing an important role. The market was highly 
regulated with very limited opportunities for users to switch to alternative suppliers. There 
was no third party access to the transmission grid (Fiorio et al., 2007). After the pioneering 
experiences of some member and neighbour states such as the UK and Norway in the 1980s, 
the European Union (EU) began an effort of gradual electricity liberalization starting with the 
first Directive in 1996. The first directive was a compromise between countries that had 
started liberalization and those that contemplated it as a very remote possibility (Trillas, 
2010). EU directive of 1996 required 15 member countries to open their retail markets at least 
partially by 2000. By 2000, all EU member countries, except Greece, had opened their retail 
markets. The other objectives in the directive include account separation between potentially 
competitive and monopolistic segments; freedom of choice for large consumers; and 
increasing autonomy of transmission networks. However, it still accepted negotiated third 
party access to networks. The directive was criticised for allowing countries too many ways 
of avoiding complying with the spirit of the reforms; not requiring a wholesale market or a 
market regulator to be set up. The unbundling requirements did not guarantee independence 
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of access to the network and the negotiated third party access (TPA) option offered the 
incumbent companies a way to keep out competitors. Retail competition was restricted, with 
no more than a few thousand consumers able to choose by 2003 even in the largest countries 
(Thomas, 2006b). 
 
The new Electricity Directive was agreed in 2003 and it placed more stringent requirements 
on member states to disintegrate their electricity industries and introduce competition in 
generation and retail supply. EU directive of 2003 required all member states to open the 
retail market to all customers excluding residential use by July 1, 2004 and to achieve 
complete liberalization by July 1, 2007. The negotiated TPA and single buyer options were 
withdrawn and access to the network has to be via regulated TPA. Member States are also 
required to appoint an independent sector regulator. Other key objectives to be achieved by 1 
July 2007 in each member state include the legal unbundling of transmission and distribution 
businesses from competitive generation and supply, free entry into generation markets and 
regular monitoring of the progress of supply competition. 
 
European Commission adopted a third package of energy market reforms in 2009; however 
the new electricity directive/regulation will come into force in 2011. This new package aims 
at extending earlier reform packages in 1996 and 2003. At the centre of the third legislative 
package, there are consumer choice, fairer prices, cleaner energy and security of supply. In 
order to reach those goals, the Commission proposes to separate production and supply from 
transmission networks; to facilitate cross-border trade in energy; to improve the effectiveness 
of national regulators; to promote cross-border collaboration and investment; to increase 
market transparency on network operation and supply and to increase solidarity among the 
EU countries. 
 
Overall, all directives aimed at creating a strongly market-based system and a single European 
electricity market. However, many of the EU member states are reluctant in implementing 
these measures. A particular problem in the EU is the lack of will among member states and 
the EU Commission to reduce the market power of dominant companies. They prefer to 
maintain or allow the emergence of “national champions” in the electricity sector. This 
preference also explains why the EU electricity reform model does not include privatization 
of any of the currently state owned assets. At present, in most of the European countries, the 
incumbents’ shares lie between 85 and 95 per cent and the incumbents are not challenged by 
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competition from new entrants. In Italy, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium, switching rates remain below 10 per cent. They are slightly above 10 per cent in 
Finland and Spain. Only three countries exhibit net switching rates exceeding 20 per cent: 
Great Britain, Sweden and Norway (Defeuilley, 2009). 
 
Today, a number of electricity market models coexist in Europe and they are different from 
one another in terms of the type of ownership, degree of openness, market concentration, and 
the degree of vertical integration. So, it is very difficult to argue that a unique European 
pattern of reform is emerging. In this section, we will briefly mention reforms in the UK, 
France, Germany, Italy, Nordic countries, Spain, Poland, Slovenia, Romania, Greece and 
Turkey.  
 
In the UK, vertically integrated state owned power utility (CEGB) was restructured in 1990 to 
separate out transmission (as the National Grid Company) and three generation companies: 
National Power, PowerGen, and Nuclear Electric. All except Nuclear Electric were privatized, 
although the modern stations of Nuclear Electric were subsequently sold as British Energy in 
1996 (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). Shortly prior to privatisation, 12 regional electricity 
distribution companies (RECs) replaced the 12 area boards and transmission became the 
responsibility of the National Grid Company (NGC), a company fully owned by the RECs 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). Also, a mandatory-pool system was introduced in 1990. However, 
due to overwhelming market power exercised by power generation utilities, it could not 
effectively decrease electricity prices and therefore was abolished later. Since then, the British 
market has gone through two more stages of reform: one by New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA) introduced in 2001 and second by the British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) in 2003. 
 
The British electricity reform involved all the elements of a full sector reform including 
restructuring, privatisation, regulation, and competition. At present, the UK market is fully 
liberalised. All consumers can choose their own supplier. Since the starting of reforms, prices 
have fallen in real terms by about 25 per cent, system reliability has been maintained at high 
levels (Thomas, 2004). Although, a competitive market is achieved through further asset 
divestiture and new entry, vertical integration has not disappeared. Distribution is still a 
regional monopoly, often integrated with electricity and gas supply. 
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Newbery and Pollitt (1997) carried out a social cost-benefit analysis of the privatisation and 
restructuring of CEGB. In their study, they found that the main benefits came from generator 
efficiency gains, switching from nuclear power, and lower emissions. On the other hand, the 
main costs came from higher prices for imported French electricity, the cost of restructuring 
and premature investment in new gas-fired generating plant. Their central estimate was a 
permanent cost reduction of 5% per year, equivalent to an extra 40% return on assets. They 
found that, as a result of reforms, consumers and government lost, and producers gained more 
than the cost reduction. Another study on social cost-benefit analysis of British reforms was 
carried out by Domah and Pollitt (2001). They conducted a social cost-benefit analysis of the 
privatisation of 12 regional electricity companies in England and Wales by examining actual 
and predicted falls in costs over the period to 2005. They found that the privatisation yielded 
significant net benefits but that these were unevenly distributed across time and groups in 
society. They concluded that, relative to preferred counterfactual, consumers experienced 
slightly lower prices and the government gained £5 billion in sale proceeds and net taxes. 
However, they argued, consumers began to gain only from 2000. 
 
British electricity market reform has been generally regarded as the example that other 
countries should follow. Consultants, encouraged by the World Bank and other international 
financial institutions, have recommended the adoption of the “British model” in countries 
with as diverse needs as India, Ukraine and Brazil; while the British model was clearly the 
inspiration for the European Commission’s directives. However, some scholars are sceptical 
about the outcomes of the reform process in the UK. For instance, Thomas (2004) argue that 
the wholesale market in the UK is dominated by confidential long-term contracts; retail 
competition has disadvantaged small consumers and makes protecting the poorest consumers 
more difficult; integrated generation and retail supply companies dominate the market; and 
price regulation has evolved into a form of traditional rate-of-return regulation. 
 
France can be considered as opposite of the British model. The French case is extraordinary in 
terms of its input mix to generate electricity. In 2008, 77% of the electricity was generated by 
nuclear plants, 14% came from hydro and renewable sources and just 9% from fossil fuels 
(US EIA, 2010b). In contrast to the UK, France was one of the latecomers in initiating reform 
and implementing the EU directives. Also, the reform in France has not led to a major change 
in the structure of the sector. Reform process in France begun only in 2000 when France 
approved a law to implement EC Directive of 1996. The reform included creation of a sector 
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regulator, a regime of regulated third party access, introduction of a wholesale market and a 
progressive opening of the sector with the possibility for the consumer to choose the retailer. 
However, today, there is still a vertically integrated public monopoly or near-monopoly (EdF) 
in France operating at all stages from generation to transmission, distribution and sales. The 
government decided to introduce only a form of accounting separation between transmission 
and generation, essentially maintaining the vertical integration of the electricity sector.  
 
Prior to the reform, there were a regime of private regional monopolies in Germany with nine 
vertically integrated regional companies, then merged in four groups which, in 2000, still 
controlled 80% of production, 40% of distribution and all transmission (Florio, 2007). In 
1998, Germany adopted EU directives regarding the liberalisation of the sector. Since then, 
Germany has realized overall liberalization but without reorganization of vertically integrated 
power companies. The reform introduced full market opening, an electricity exchange and a 
regulatory body. Today, the German electricity market is still characterised by a high degree 
of vertical and horizontal integration dominated by a few large companies, which prevents 
competition and keeps barriers for new entrants and investments. 
 
In 1999, Italy adopted EU directive of 1996 and liberalized its electricity sector by 
unbundling state owned vertically integrated company (ENEL), creating a state-owned 
transmission system operator, and privatizing some power stations of ENEL (a total capacity 
of 15,000 MW) to limit its market share to 50% after 2003. Today, the main problem in 
Italian power market is the dominant position of ENEL in basically all segments of the 
business. An additional obstacle to the development of effective competition is the majority 
stake of government in ENEL, which translates into significant political interference on the 
definition of the objectives as well as the management of the company (Ferrari and Giulietti, 
2005). Today, ENEL still controls about 40% of the generation and the entire distribution 
network is virtually controlled by ENEL, with the exception of few cities where the local 
municipalities own the distribution companies. 
 
Norway was the first among the Nordic countries to liberalise its electricity market in 1991, in 
line with British model but without privatisation. Today, the Norwegian electricity industry 
remains almost entirely in public hands. Rather than implementing their own reforms, the 
other Nordic countries chose to reform by merging with the existing Norwegian market. Nord 
Pool, the electricity power exchange with equity participation from each country’s system 
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operators, was founded by Norway and Sweden in 1996. Finland joined the NordPool in 1998 
and Denmark in 1999. Reforms in the Nordic region seem to have been relatively successful, 
merging the four countries’ (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) systems into one 
market. This success is apparent in the fact that unlike the California electricity market that 
collapsed following from severe demand and supply shocks in 2000-2001, the “lights have 
stayed on” in the Nordic market in spite of similar adverse supply and demand shocks in 
2002-3 (Amundsen and Bergman, 2006). However, electricity prices in the region have 
increased as a result of a rise in electricity taxes and the introduction of the European system 
of CO2 emission permits, which limited the popularity of the reforms in the region. Since the 
decisions to raise electricity taxes and to introduce emission permits have nothing to do with 
reform process, Nordic electricity market seems to work quite well so far. Amundsen and 
Bergman (2006) conclude that the main factors behind the relatively successful electricity 
market reform in the Nordic countries include (i) a simple but sound market design, to a large 
extent made possible by the large share of hydropower, (ii) successful dilution of market 
power, attained by the integration of the four national markets into a single Nordic market, 
(iii) strong political support for a market-based electricity market, (iv) voluntary, informal 
commitment to public service by the power industry. They also argue that the second and 
third of these factors are “transferable”, while the first and fourth to a large extent are country-
specific. 
 
In Sweden, reform process was initiated in 1996. The retail market was fully opened and 
since 1996 the consumers can choose their own supplier. The transmission system remained 
in a non-profit public monopoly regime. The Finnish case is unique in the sense that even 
before the reform; the market was already very open (Pineau and Hämäläinen, 2000). Finland 
decided to reform the sector in 1995 and since then the market was progressively liberalized. 
In 1997, the consumers got the right to choose their supplier. The reform also established the 
separation between the transmission and generation firms although the distribution companies 
are not fully unbundled. The reform experience in Denmark was similar to that of the other 
Nordic countries and begun in 1996 and was completed in 2001 when consumers were 
granted the right to choose the supplier and the industry was totally unbundled. In Denmark, 
electricity sector is characterized by the presence of public local companies and, in spite of 
some privatization, the overall ownership structure still remains mostly public. 
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The reform of the energy sector begun in Spain with a law enacted in 1994 with the aim of 
liberalizing electricity sector. It mandated the legal unbundling of the transmission network 
and created an independent joint public-private transmission system operator (REE), which 
offered regulated TPA to both the transmission and the distribution networks. A new law was 
adopted in 1997 to accelerate the process of liberalization. Full market opening has been 
implemented in Spain since 2003. In 2006, the Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL) was 
founded and aimed at creating an integrated electricity wholesale market with Portugal, 
notably by creating a single market operator for the wholesale Iberian pool market. Today, 
although there exists a market regulator, what consumers end up paying and firms receiving is 
ultimately determined by regulated tariffs, which are set by the government on an annual 
basis, and in a non-transparent manner. Also, the new system has failed in attracting new 
entry, and in promoting the efficient amount of investment needed to guarantee adequate 
reserve margins. Entry has been dissuaded by the incumbent firms. This has mainly been 
achieved by the strategic announcement of new investment plants that have never been carried 
out (Crampes and Fabra, 2005). The most relevant outcome of the electricity reform in Spain 
so far has been the emergence of some big firms that consolidated their generation assets. The 
market is mostly controlled by the three largest companies. 
 
In Poland, electricity reforms took place within the context of Poland’s post-Cold War 
transition from socialist to market economy. Before the reform, whole energy sector was 
controlled by a single vertically integrated company. Between 1987 and 1990, electricity was 
separated from this structure, but remained a vertically integrated industry. In Poland, 
electricity tariffs were massively subsidized through housing subsidies; tariffs paid by 
residential consumers recovered only 1% of the cost of supply (Williams and Ghanadan, 
2006). In 1990, the electricity sector was unbundled both vertically and horizontally into 
autonomous state-owned enterprises and a transmission company (PSE) was set up. In 1993, 
all distribution utilities and a number of generators were turned into joint stock companies, 
which were to be privatized through stock sales (with a limit of 50% on foreign ownership). 
PSE operated the grid as a single buyer based on power purchase agreements with the 
generators. In 1997, a wholesale market was created and replaced the single-buyer model. A 
spot market was also set up in 2000. Reform process has raised tariffs to near 90% of full cost 
recovery, but at a high cost in public support for reforms. At present, Polish market witnesses 
rebundling and vertical reintegration. Two big state-owned utilities (representing almost half 
of Poland’s electricity market) were created by merging a number of generation, distribution 
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companies and some coal mines (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). This move reflects a 
growing view in many small EU member sates that large, state-supported utilities will be 
more competitive in a unified EU market than small unbundled companies. The same trend 
has been witnessed in Slovenia as well. As a new member state of the EU, Slovenia has been 
required to adopt EU legislation in full and opened its electricity market fully in 2007 when 
all consumers became eligible. Electricity reforms in Slovenia included market liberalization, 
unbundling of activities, allowing regulated TPA, formation of an organized power market, 
adoption of incentive-based price cap regulation and the establishment of an independent 
regulatory body. Like Poland, Slovenia has merged the majority of the state owned power 
plants into a holding of electricity companies (HSE) in 2001 (Hrovatin et al., 2009). 
 
In Romania, the vertically integrated, state owned monopoly was divided into five separate 
state owned enterprises over the 1998-2000 period: one each for nuclear generation, hydro 
generation, thermal generation, transmission, and distribution. Since then the distribution 
function has been further divided into eight regional companies, five of which were 
privatized. The wholesale market has been operating in Romania since 2000 and the market 
was fully liberalized in 2007 and all consumers can choose their supplier since then (Diaconu 
et al., 2009). 
 
Electricity market in Greece was also dominated by a vertically integrated, state owned 
company (PPC) until the reforms. Greece embarked on electricity market liberalization in 
2001 both to comply with EU directives and to encourage private investments. PPC was 
converted to a share company but remained under state control. A mandatory pool system was 
set up and full market opening has applied since 2007. At present, PPC still holds a highly 
dominant position in both electricity generation and power supply markets. Customer tariffs 
applied by PPC, which holds 98% of consumers, are regulated by the state and their structure 
still includes large cross-subsidizations among customer categories. It is also claimed that the 
level of regulated electricity prices is below power generation costs (Iliadou, 2009). Besides, 
compliance with the EU legislation on unbundling has been delayed in Greece and is still 
poorly developed. Legal unbundling was introduced only in relation to transmission, while 
PPC remains the exclusive owner of the transmission and the distribution networks. 
 
Being a candidate for EU membership since 1960s, Turkey has also closely followed EU 
directives. Before the reforms, as was the case in many European countries, the Turkish 
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electricity industry was dominated by a state-owned vertically integrated company (TEK). In 
1982, public monopoly on generation was abolished and the private sector was allowed to 
build power plants and sell their electricity to TEK. In 1984, TEK was restructured and 
gained the status of state-owned enterprise. In 1993, TEK was incorporated into privatization 
plan and split into two separate state-owned enterprises, one for generation and transmission 
(TEAS) and other for distribution (TEDAS). In 2001, the reform process in electricity market 
was initiated. TEAS was restructured to form three new state-owned public enterprises: a 
transmission company (TEIAS), a generation company (EUAS) and a wholesale company 
(TETAS) (Erdogdu, 2010, Erdogdu, 2009, Erdogdu, 2007). Turkey’s electricity distribution 
network was further divided into 21 distribution regions. TEDAS, which owns 20 of the 21 
regions, was included in the privatization programme, and a separate distribution company 
was established in each of these 20 regions. Only three of these companies have been 
privatized so far and all others are still owned by TEDAS. There has been no progress in 
generation privatizations. 
 
2.2.3. Electricity market reforms in Eurasia 
 
In Eurasia region, each country’s power sector consisted of a vertically integrated public 
sector monopoly immediately following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Since then, each 
country has adopted a different strategy with respect to industry structure. These strategies 
have included different types of vertical unbundling, regulation, privatisation and 
restructuring. Here we will focus on reforms in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and some countries in Central Asia. 
 
In Russia, reforms were adopted more as an ideological undertaking than as a result of 
economic necessity. Reforms in general aimed at diminishing the power of party-state in 
general and incumbents in particular. Actually, the electricity sector in Russia was doing 
better than many other countries and was as developed as those in the US or UK (Yi-chong, 
2006). Without serious problems, changes were not so radical. The reform’s another objective 
was to attract domestic and foreign private investment to modernise and develop the 
electricity system (Engoian, 2006). The restructuring of Russia’s power generation sector will 
be complete when state monopoly (RAO UES) dissolves. The country’s transmission grid 
will remain under state control. The reform has created a generation sector divided into 
multiple wholesale electricity companies, which participate in a new competitive wholesale 
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market. The creation of six wholesale electricity companies was completed in 2006. Today, 
there are seven separate regional power systems in the Russian electricity sector. RAO UES, 
which is 52 percent owned by the Russian government, controls most of the transmission and 
distribution in Russia. It owns 96 percent of the transmission and distribution system, and the 
wholesale electricity market (FOREM).  
 
Electricity reform in Ukraine started in 1996. Vertically integrated national companies were 
unbundled and single-buyer model with compulsory pool market was adopted. Privatization 
process of the electricity companies began in 1997 but was cancelled in 1999 due to 
corruption. The reforms in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were in general in the form of 
privatization and aimed at attracting foreign investment. Armenia began power sector reform 
in 1997. Unbundling and privatization in distribution were carried out, and foreign capital 
introduction was realized. In Georgia, unbundling was executed in 1997, along with 
privatization of the power generation company and the distribution companies (Nagayama, 
2007). In Azerbaijan, key restructuring initiative was to separate electricity distribution from 
generation and transmission, and to auction concessions to the private sector for the 
management of its four distribution companies (Mehta et al., 2007). At present, transmission 
and generation assets are held by vertically integrated state-owned enterprise. Further vertical 
unbundling is unlikely to proceed.  
 
Kazakhstan has gone much further than any other country in the region in terms of power 
sector reform. It initiated unbundling and privatization in 1996. The government first 
unbundled power generation from transmission, and privatized most of the power generation 
capacity. Transmission and distribution were remained under public domain but performed by 
separate government-run companies. In 1998, the power wholesale market was established. 
Today, Kazakhstan has multiple generators that sell bulk power at unregulated prices and 
wholesale prices are negotiated between suppliers and buyers, who may choose which 
generators to contract with (Nagayama, 2007). In Tajikistan, vertically integrated public 
utility was corporatized in 2001 to facilitate further structural changes and improve the 
commercial performance of the sector. But, apart from this, no reform steps has been taken so 
far. Kyrgyzstan also corporatized its vertically integrated electricity utility but it also 
unbundled it into several generation companies, a transmission company, and four 
distribution companies in 2001. Each of these companies is currently publicly owned but has 
managerial autonomy.  
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2.2.4. Electricity market reforms in North America 
 
For most of its history the US electricity sector has been dominated by large, vertically 
integrated, and heavily regulated private utilities. The U.S. has never implemented a 
mandatory comprehensive federal electricity market reform program, leaving the most 
significant reform decisions to the states. As a result, many U.S. states have introduced only 
limited liberalization without fundamental electricity sector restructuring (Joskow, 2008). 
 
Beginning in the late 1970s, some steps were taken to reform traditional structure. By the late 
1990s, extensive disintegration, considerably looser regulation, and more market-oriented 
operation were characteristics of the new US electricity industry. The reforms were mainly 
intended to bring competition to wholesale market. Competition among independent 
generators was supposed to create a framework for wholesale power transactions so that retail 
customers and local distribution utilities could purchase power from a wide range of 
alternative suppliers. The result was supposed to be lower wholesale costs and thus lower 
retail prices. By the year 2000, about half of the states either had restructured their electricity 
sectors or was planning to do so (Kwoka, 2008). Sioshansi (2008) argue that the pace of 
growth in retail competition has slowed in recent years in US and the transition to a national 
competitive electricity market has stalled. He cites the reasons for this as (i) the spectacular 
failure of the California market, (ii) mixed results in a number of states that have introduced 
retail competition, (iii) problems in some wholesale markets that have not performed as 
expected, and (iv) a lack of interest by the US Congress to push retail competition at the 
national level. Among these reasons, California crisis needs further focus. The California 
electricity market reform had promised to deliver reliable service at low and stable prices. The 
California electricity deregulation process was put into effect in 1998. In the period prior to 
reform, there was a considerable excess generation capacity and electricity prices were above 
normal. The reform program included the introduction of new institutional arrangements such 
as power exchange and independent system operator, restructuring, fixing end-user prices at 
1996 level and a ban on new long-term power purchase contracts. Public power companies 
were excluded from the deregulation process but had to continue providing cheap electricity. 
The summer of 1998 showed tendencies to excessive wholesale prices but apart from this 
there was no particular problem and the market seemed to function fairly well until 2000. 
Prices on the wholesale market started to increase in the early summer of 2000 and continued 
 29 
to do so in the following months. The first of several forced black outs took place in June 
2000. During this period the three major companies started to lose money on a large scale and 
became unable to pay for their power purchases. Consequently, the power generation 
companies became reluctant to sell power on the power exchange as their contracts were not 
honoured. The cap on end-user prices effectively hindered that rising wholesale prices 
transformed into rising end-user prices that would otherwise result in a reduction of 
consumption. Also, the restrictions on the long-term power contracts implied lacking hedging 
opportunities. Finally, the power exchange broke down and was declared bankrupt in March 
2001 (Amundsen and Bergman, 2006). Woo (2001) identifies the major factors that 
contributed to California crisis as follows: poor market design, market power, demand growth 
(due to extremely warm weather during the summer of 2000) not matched by new capacity, a 
sizable reduction of hydro power generation (due to dry weather conditions), rising marginal 
cost (due to an increase in the price of natural gas by some 70 percent from April to 
November 2000), and financial insolvency. He also concludes California experience suggests 
that a reversible regulatory reform is a safe alternative to an irreversible market reform (for 
further details, see Sweeney (2002)). 
 
The problems in California and elsewhere brought further restructuring to a halt in US but 
many states were irreversibly committed to deregulation. At present, electricity restructuring 
is substantially complete in some regions of the US, although other regions are much less 
affected. 
 
In Canada, electricity reform started in the province of Alberta in 1996 where competition 
was introduced into power generation, and a wholesale electric pool was created. Alberta had 
a positive experience with reform leading to substantial new investment and reduction and 
stabilisation of prices. On the other hand, in Ontario, political mismanagement of a power 
crisis led to reform being abandoned and government interference into prices (Sioshansi, 
2008). 
 
2.2.5. Electricity market reforms in Asia and Oceania 
 
Like Eurasia, power market reforms in Asia and Oceania have been gradually taking effect in 
some countries but halted in others. In this sub-section we cover the reform experiences in 
Australia, New Zealand, India, China, Japan, Philippines, South Korea and Hong Kong. 
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The 1990s witnessed a substantial reform in the Australian electricity sector. Since 1991, the 
industry has been broken up into its constituent parts; a national wholesale market for 
electricity was created, competition was introduced to electricity generation and retail supply 
sectors. The reform process was initiated in the State of Victoria for the first time in Australia. 
Victoria’s vertically integrated electricity company was divided into generation, transmission 
and distribution/retail. Later, distribution/retail was further divided into five companies with 
separate franchise areas and generation was broken up into seven separate generation 
companies. Until 1997, these companies were privatized. In 1994, a wholesale electricity pool 
was established in Victoria and it was merged with the New South Wales wholesale market in 
1998, creating the national wholesale electricity market. After the creation of national 
wholesale market, ownership and operation of the transmission system was separated and a 
public company was made responsible for the operation of the system. As a whole, the 
introduction of competition and privatization led to substantial improvements in productive 
efficiency. Capital utilization rates greatly increased and staff numbers reduced. The largest 
gainers from the reform process were the large industrial and commercial consumers, who 
were able to take advantage of competition among retailers. Households saw little change in 
the real average price of electricity (Abbott, 2006). Today, the progress of liberalization varies 
from state to state in Australia. New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland have achieved 
liberalization in the retail sector while West Australia still maintains a vertically integrated 
structure.  
 
From 1992 to 1995, significant reforms took place in New Zealand electricity market. In 
1992, an electricity law was passed and it provided liberalization of the market and regulation 
of transmission and distribution segments. In 1998, another law was enacted and required 
forced ownership unbundling of electricity distribution from the rest of the electricity 
industry. Until 2001, there was no explicit sector regulator and the regulation was left to 
general competition authority. In 2001, a specific sector-focused regulation was introduced 
and electricity market regulatory commission became operational in 2003. Nillesen and Pollitt 
(2008) examined the impact of the policy of forced ownership unbundling of electricity 
distribution on electricity prices, quality of service and costs. They found that ownership 
unbundling did not achieve its objective of facilitating greater competition in the electricity 
supply industry but that it led to lower costs and higher quality of service. They concluded 
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that this experience indicated the potential benefits of ownership unbundling in Europe but 
also the danger of unintended consequences. 
 
In India, electricity theft, corruption, and a highly cross-subsidized pricing structure have 
made it nearly impossible for the utilities to improve power service. The quality and 
reliability of electricity have been so low that industrial consumers across India exit the state-
run system and rely on their own on-site power generation (Joseph, 2010). India initiated 
power sector reforms in 1991 when the country was facing a political and economic crisis and 
was under pressure to open up the economy as part of a reform package agreed with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. IPPs were allowed to enter the power 
generation business and were offered attractive incentives. Although the initial interest was 
overwhelming, the enthusiasm was short-lived as only a few projects actually materialised. 
Second wave of significant attempts for reform came in the late 1990s. During this period, the 
State Electricity Boards (SEBs) began to be unbundled and even State of Orissa fully 
privatized its generation, transmission, and distribution assets. Besides, regulatory 
commissions were set up at the central and state levels and single buyer model was 
introduced. Soon, it was argued that deeper reforms were required to manage, regulate and co-
ordinate development of the electricity industry in India. New legislative framework was 
adopted in 2003. The new act has de-licensed generation (except hydro), provided for the 
separation of system operation and transmission activities, allowed trading at wholesale and 
retail levels and permitted multiple licensing at transmission and distribution levels (Singh, 
2006). However, despite the enactment of a comprehensive legal framework for governing the 
electricity industry, limited progress has been made in terms of achieving widespread sector 
liberalisation and privatisation in India (Bhattacharyya, 2007). At present, the electricity 
sector continues to perform poorly. There are still peak capacity shortages and energy deficits. 
Some consumers, like those in the agricultural sector, receive subsidized electricity and pay 
little or nothing for the electricity they consume. 
 
China has the second largest electricity industry in the world and is playing an important role 
within the global economy. In the past two decades, it has also experienced a series of 
regulatory reforms in its electricity industry. With the development of the economy since the 
1980s, the demand for electricity grew rapidly and power shortage became more serious than 
ever. In order to attract more investments to develop the electricity industry and relieve the 
bottleneck of power shortage, the investments from local governments, domestic enterprises 
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and foreign investors in generation sector have been allowed since 1985. The Ministry of 
Electric Power was abolished in 1998, with its business functions transferred to the newly 
formed vertically integrated public utility (SPC), which was corporatized shortly. In 2002, 
SPC was divested and the generation sector was separated from the transmission and 
distribution sectors. Generation function was allocated to five big generation corporations. A 
regulatory body was set up in 2003 and the introduction of the wholesale electricity market is 
also in process (Du et al., 2009). Currently, the Chinese electricity industry has evolved into a 
dual system, with dominant state planning at the core, and a decentralised generation system 
at the periphery, owned by state organisations at different levels and by private enterprises. 
While the generation sector has some market competition, the transmission and distribution 
sectors are heavily state-controlled. There is still a chronic electricity shortage, with industrial 
consumers are frequently asked to shut down production during peak times and arrange 
production schedules at nights or weekends (Cherni and Kentish, 2007). As also concluded by 
Yeoh and Rajaraman (2004), China still has a huge task ahead of it to complete reform 
process. Because it places a higher value on political and economic stability than economic 
efficiency, and because of its unfamiliarity with a market economy, the transition to a 
competitive market could take many more years in China. 
 
Electricity reforms in the Japanese electricity industry started in 1995 and for the first time 
IPPs were allowed to enter into the generating market by introducing the competitive bidding 
in the wholesale market. The government also introduced yardstick regulation, under which 
the electricity price of each electricity company is determined partly by comparing its 
performance with that of other companies. Companies with higher costs than others suffer 
losses, while those with smaller costs generate profits. Therefore, this system is expected to 
promote the cost cutting competition (Nakano and Managi, 2008). Partial liberalization in 
retail markets was introduced for large consumers in 2000 when power producers and 
suppliers were allowed to enter the market and use networks. Although the liberalization is 
limited in part by the fact that the retail power market has only about 30% share of total 
electricity demand, the eligible customers now have a choice among the nine major utilities 
and ten new entrants (Asano, 2006). Besides, Ida et al. (2007) found that first-period reforms, 
implemented in 1996-1999, were able to reduce costs by 7.5%; while second-period reforms, 
during the period of 2000 to 2002, effectively cut costs by 11.8% in Japanese electricity 
market, with respect to the base costs before regulatory reforms. 
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In Philippines, reform process initiated in 2001 when the government focused on introducing 
structural reform and market mechanism principles into the electric power sector. Reform 
objectives included full privatization of state-owned electricity utility, promotion of private 
participation in power market, establishment of a wholesale spot market and full liberalization 
of the market. However, in practice, many of these steps are behind schedule. The power 
prices were distorted due to the take-or-pay contracts with IPPs. Today, the sector reform is 
still ongoing in the Philippines and electricity prices are still among the highest in Asia. A 
wholesale electricity spot market was launched in 2006. Since there is no sufficient number of 
market participants to create a competitive environment, wholesale prices have not decreased.  
 
Toba (2007) carried out an empirical investigation into the welfare impacts of the introduction 
of private sector participation into the Philippines electricity generation sector by liberalizing 
the market for independent power producers (IPPs) during the power crisis of 1990-1993. The 
study used a social cost-benefit analysis and found that the main benefits came from IPPs that 
contributed to resolving the crisis and promoted economic and social development. The paper 
concluded that consumers and investors were net gainers, while the government lost and there 
was an air pollution cost. Overall, the study found that the reform with private sector 
participation increased social welfare in Philippines. 
 
South Korea began transforming the structure of its electricity industry from the public 
monopoly to market competition in 1998. Until then, the electricity industry of the country 
had been dominated by a state-owned vertically integrated company (KEPCO). The 
restructuring plan aimed at introducing market competition and privatization to the power 
industry, which was accompanied by the vertical unbundling and horizontal divestiture of 
KEPCO. As the first step of this plan, in 2001, the power generation function of KEPCO was 
divided into five thermal and hydropower generation companies and one company for nuclear 
power generation. Five companies were planned to be privatized over the next several years. 
However, in 2004, the Korean government suspended its electricity market reform based on 
the recommendation of a joint study team, which concluded in their final report that the 
alleged benefits of reform are theoretical and uncertain, while the real costs and risks are 
substantial. This suspension effectively interrupted the original plan adopted in 1998 by the 
previous administration to divest and privatize KEPCO’s generation assets and introduce 
wholesale and retail competition (Lee and Ahn, 2006). 
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In Hong Kong, electricity has been supplied by two vertically integrated companies and both 
companies have been regulated under the Scheme of Control (SOC) agreements. A SOC 
agreement is a formal, long-term regulatory contract for 15 years, signed between a private 
firm and the government. Under the SOC, the two electric utilities are subject to rate-of-return 
and price control (Chan, 2006). The first SOC was signed in 1964. The industry under the 
SOC was relatively successful in providing sufficient and reliable electricity supply to meet 
Hong Kong’s rapid economic growth, and therefore the agreement was extended in 1978 and 
again in 1993 (Lam, 2004). The government conducted a review on the regulatory and market 
model of the electricity supply industry in light of the expiry of the existing SOC agreements 
with the vertical integrated utilities in 2008. However, the SOC agreements were renewed as a 
result of review process and new agreements came into effect from 1 October 2008. 
 
2.2.6. Electricity market reforms in Africa 
 
The reforms in Africa were very limited in terms of scope and scale and almost in all reform 
cases the main motive was to encourage foreign private direct investment in power markets. 
In Africa, only few countries introduced a substantial reform program in their electricity 
industries. Here we will briefly mention reform experiences in South Africa, Ghana, 
Cameroon and Nigeria. 
 
In South Africa, under the apartheid government, prior to 1994, government policies were 
geared at serving the needs of the minority white population group. Energy policies, including 
electricity provision, focused on ensuring sufficient supply for the mining, chemical and 
agricultural industries, which formed the backbone of the South African economy. When the 
new, democratic government came into power in 1994, South Africa’s energy policy saw a 
fundamental shift in focus. In 1995 the government established the National Electricity 
Regulator as a successor to the Electricity Control Board that had been established in 1987. 
Electricity generation in South Africa has been dominated by Eskom, the state-owned 
electricity utility. Eskom owns, operates and maintains the national transmission grid and is 
thus a de facto monopolist on both the generation and transmission level. In 2002, Eskom was 
converted into a public company pursuant to the Eskom Conversion Act of 2001. At present, 
Eskom is regulated by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) in 
accordance with the Electricity Regulation Act of 2006. However, as suggested by Newbery 
(2009), little progress has been made in South Africa in terms of electricity sector reform. 
 35 
Privatisation process was abandoned; regulator was created but the prices are still based on 
historic costs and, most importantly, demand has predictably outstripped the capacity. Today, 
Eskom continues to generate approximately 95% of the electricity used in South Africa.  
 
Prior to reform, Ghana’s small electricity sector consisted primarily of two state enterprises, 
one operated all generation and transmission (VRA), and the other was distribution utility 
(ECG). VRA performed well technically and financially, but ECG did not, with high system 
losses and poor service quality. Even after a series of increases, tariffs only recovered one-
third of long run marginal costs and only 24% of the population had access to electricity in 
1993. Electricity reform was triggered in 1993 by a supply crisis due to rapidly rising demand 
and drought. When the government approached the World Bank to finance new thermal 
generation, it was required to increase tariffs, remove barriers to private participation, and 
plan a comprehensive reform. An independent regulator was created. However, when a 
foreign aluminium factory declared bankruptcy in 2001 and pulled its operations out of 
Ghana, the country lost its largest consumer, and was left with excess capacity and expensive 
obligations to buy gas-generated thermal power. Today, electricity sector in Ghana continues 
to be a strain on the national budget. After a decade of reform, the basic structure of Ghana’s 
power sector remained the same (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). 
 
In Cameroon, the government decided in 1996 to privatize the vertically integrated electricity 
utility (SONEL). At the end of five years of work devoted to the precise definition of the 
restructuring strategy of the sector, an American group (AES) acquired 51% of SONEL 
shares and signed a contract for a 20-year concession. The new entity borne out of this 
transfer was named AES-SONEL. Today, AES-SONEL has a monopoly on the generation, 
transmission, and distribution of electricity in Cameroon. So, reform process in Cameroon 
only resulted in a transfer of public monopoly into private one and has failed to promote 
social, environmental or economic sustainability (Pineau, 2002).  
 
In Nigeria, state owned power utility (NEPA) was commercialized in 1988. In 2005, the 
monopoly of NEPA in electricity industry was broken and wholesale competition model was 
put into practice. NEPA was divided into 18 companies, including 6 generators, 11 
distributors and one transmission company. Currently, the government holds the shares in the 
successor companies but it is planned that these companies would gradually be privatized 
(Ikeme and Ebohon, 2005). 
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3. Research gap, research questions and data collection 
 
It has been shown in other economic sectors that market oriented reforms is a possible tool to 
improve economic performance, efficiency and welfare. In the electricity industries around 
the world, many reform programs have been put into practice since the early 1980s but there 
has been little cross-country applied research conducted on the economic consequences of 
such reforms. Although there is a relatively extensive literature on electricity market reforms 
in the form of opinion expression and case study discussions, the studies that adopt a cross-
country perspective with a quantitative approach are extremely limited. In short, there is a real 
gap in the empirical literature with regard to the analysis of the consequences of the power 
market reforms. This is quite surprising given the economic importance of the sector both for 
individual countries and for the world economy, as well as the significant number of reform 
programs that have already initiated in many power sectors. 
 
In the PhD study, we aim at assessing the outcomes of power market reforms by analysing 
cross-country data and developing a logical framework/models to evaluate empirical evidence 
from various countries. Throughout the study, we aim at answering following research 
questions: 
i. What are the overall welfare effects of electricity market reforms, especially in 
developing countries? To be precise, does empirical evidence on electricity market 
reform support or verify the logic of reforms? 
ii. What are the key differences between developing and developed countries in terms of 
electricity market design and how do these differences shape the outcome of reform 
process?  
iii. What are the implications of electricity market reform process on development efforts 
in developing countries? 
iv. Do some market designs work better in certain countries and under some system 
features than others? 
v. What is the role of country-level factors such as the level of economic development, 
economic policies, and institutional structure in the success of the reform process? 
vi. What is the impact of moving from a monopolistic electricity market structure towards 
a competitive one on the convergence of electricity price-cost margins in diverse 
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countries towards their average value and on cross-subsidy levels between consumer 
groups? 
vii. How do reforms affect quality of service, efficiency and foreign direct investment in 
electricity markets? 
viii. Is there an optimum sequencing of reform steps?  
ix. How do country specific qualitative factors (e.g. educational background or 
ideological position of decision makers) influence the outcome of the reform process? 
 
Ideally, empirical analysis of electricity reforms in the proposed PhD study will address all 
the questions above. However, data availability has considerable bearing on how and to what 
extent these questions are addressed. To answer these questions as fully as possible, we have 
collected data on various variables in relation to electricity reforms. Data collection process is 
not complete and, using different data collection methods, we will try to add additional 
variables that contribute to our analysis. 
 
Currently, our data set includes a panel of 92 countries for a period beginning in 1982 and 
extending through 2009. Year 1982 is selected as the starting date for the study because at 
that time electricity market reform was initiated for the first time in Chile. The final date, 
2009, represents the last year for which data are available at the time the research is 
conducted. We included in our sample almost all countries where a kind of electricity market 
reform process has been initiated so far. Because of the missing observations, our panel is 
unbalanced. Due to limitations on the length of this report, we could not mention details of 
each variable but description of variables and sources of data can be found in Appendix 
section. 
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4. First Paper: The impact of power market reforms on convergence 
towards the average price-cost margin: a cross country panel data 
analysis (In progress) 
The impact of power market reforms on convergence towards the average 
price-cost margin: a cross country panel data analysis 
(In progress) 
 
Erkan Erdogdua,b,*
 
 
a Judge Business School, Univ. of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the main targets of power market reforms in the world has been price-cost margins. 
This paper focuses on this issue by looking at the impact of the power market reforms on the 
convergence of residential and industrial electricity price-cost margins in diverse countries 
towards their average value and on cross-subsidy levels between consumer groups. Using 
panel data for 63 developed and developing countries covering the period 1982–2009, 
empirical models are developed and analyzed. The research findings suggest that, in most 
cases, reform process causes price-cost margins in different countries to move towards their 
average value. Besides, it is found that there is a negative relationship between absolute value 
of deviation from unit industrial/residential price ratio and the shift towards a competitive 
market model, meaning that as countries take more reform steps the size of cross subsidy 
between consumer groups tends to decline. Overall, based on empirical evidence, the study 
found that application of competitive market models in electricity industries makes electricity 
price-cost margins converge towards the average and prices more cost-reflective by reducing 
the size of cross subsidies between industrial and residential consumers, after controlling for 
                                                 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44(0)787-6063091 
   E-mail: ee243@cam.ac.uk 
b The author is a PhD candidate at Judge Business School and a member of Electricity Policy Research Group 
(EPRG) of University of Cambridge (UK). The present paper is still in progress and, when completed, will 
constitute one of the three papers that form his PhD thesis. The views, findings and conclusions expressed in this 
article are entirely those of the author and do not represent in any way the views of any institution he is affiliated 
with. 
 39 
industry and country-specific variables. Furthermore, the study suggests that power 
consumption, income level, electricity losses and country specific features constitute other 
important determinants of convergence towards average electricity price-cost margin and 
cross-subsidy levels between consumer groups. 
 
Keywords: Models with Panel Data; Power Market Reform; Price-cost margin 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
It is a common knowledge that price and quality go hand in hand. It makes little sense to buy 
a cheap product without knowing its quality. The same applies for electricity; that is, cheap 
electricity does not really mean much if there are constant interruptions in the supply but 
paying huge sums of money for no interruptions at all does not make sense either. Since the 
early 1980s, billions of dollars have been spent on reforming electricity industries around the 
world and, price and quality have always been among the most important targets of power 
market reforms. It may well be argued that one of the most important objectives of the reform 
process has been setting these two indicators at optimum levels. In all reforming countries 
(whether developed or developing), reforms in power markets have aimed at realizing two 
common objectives: (i) reductions in absolute price-cost margins and making price-cost 
margins convergence towards the optimum level, and (ii) improvements in service quality. In 
this paper, we focus on the former while investigation of the latter is left to future papers. 
 
By introducing cost-reflective pricing, improving efficiency (and, thereby, reducing costs) in 
the sector; the reforms are expected not only to make electricity price-cost margins in 
different countries converge towards their average but also to reduce cross-subsidy levels 
between consumer groups. It is argued that, even in the short run, reform process introduces 
competition, which in turn encourages economic units with the lowest costs to operate in the 
market while discouraging those that cannot profitably participate at the prevailing market 
prices. Besides, over the longer term, markets present better incentives for new entrants; and 
new entrants with more efficient technologies put additional downward pressure on prices. 
Together with cost-reflective prices and improved efficiency in the industry, it is expected 
that the introduction of reforms in the electricity markets causes price-cost margins in 
different countries to move towards their average value. This paper tries to find out whether 
power market reforms have realized these expectations, or in other words, whether the 
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reforms have moved price-cost margins towards their long-run average and made prices more 
cost-reflective by reducing the size of cross subsidies between consumer groups. 
 
The paper also aims at clarifying whether the effects of power sector reforms are different 
between industrial and residential consumers and between developed and developing 
countries. Empirical econometric models are estimated and analyzed to observe the impact of 
electricity market reform process on convergence towards average electricity price-cost 
margin and cross-subsidy levels. The econometric models are designed using panel data from 
63 countries1
 
. The dataset covers the period from 1982 to 2009. 
We try to answer following research questions: (i) what is the impact of power market 
reforms on convergence towards the average electricity price-cost margin? (ii) does 
liberalization result in more cost-reflective prices by reducing cross-subsidies between 
consumer groups? (iii) what are the other factors that influence convergence towards the 
average electricity price-cost margin and cross-subsidy levels, and how much are they 
influential relative to reform process? 
 
In point of fact, fluctuations in fossil fuel prices constitute one of the most important 
determinants of final electricity prices. However, to our surprise, this variable has been 
ignored so far in almost all cross country econometric studies trying to explain the impact of 
reforms on electricity prices (see Ernst & Young (2006), Fiorio et al. (2007), Nagayama 
(2007, 2009), Steiner (2001) and Thomas (2006a)). Since fuel costs are probably the most 
                                                 
1 Based on income group and geographical region they belong to, countries are classified into three groups 
below. All countries defined as high-income economies by World Bank are grouped as developed countries. All 
other countries in our dataset are put together as developing countries (for further details, see  WORLD BANK 
2010a. World Bank Country Classifications, URL: http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0.) 
Developed countries (32): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), 
Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States. 
Developing countries in America (21): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Other developing countries (10): China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey. 
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important component of end user prices, any study excluding this variable destines to fall 
short. In view of the fact that our study is the first econometric study to take into account 
variations in fuel costs in the explanation of impact of reforms, it not only is an important 
contribution to the existing literature but also fills an important gap in this area. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section provides a brief background to power market 
reform process and tries to clarify what the reform is. Section 4.3 presents a literature review 
on the impact of electricity sector reform process on electricity prices. Section 4.4 
summarizes the methodological framework. Section 4.5 describes data. Following section 
presents empirical analysis and discusses the preliminary results. Section 4.7 mentions 
potential limitations of the study. Section 4.8 comments on the prospects of further 
development of the paper. The last section concludes. 
 
4.2. Background to reform 
 
Actually, the initial push for the creation of power grids was private but it was not long before 
deeper government involvement was evidenced. This occurred with varying degrees across 
countries, especially after World War II (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). However, whether 
private or not, electricity industry was regarded as a natural monopoly in almost all countries 
and structured as a vertically integrated utility. The rationale for this includes some 
judgements about the industry. First of all, it was believed that in the electricity sector one 
firm produces output less expensively than if there were multiple firms in the market as 
average costs declined as output increased. Government ownership of the monopoly (or 
public regulation) was also justified on the grounds that the state was the guardian of the 
public interest and therefore would be the least likely to act in an opportunistic manner, as 
monopolists were likely to do. Besides, ownership by only one firm also helped to ensure the 
necessary coordination among the different segments of the industry (generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail supply). Moreover, a general assumption was made about 
the strategic nature of the power industry for economic development, which justified both 
vertical integration and public ownership. In short, pre-reform structure of the electricity 
industry was primarily motivated by the existence of natural monopoly conditions, 
externalities, and so-called “public good” characteristics (Steiner, 2001). In fact, however, 
electricity industry is characterised by these characteristics on the whole but some of its 
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functional segments do not possess these features. Functionally, electricity industry may be 
divided into generation, transmission, distribution, and supply. Transmission and distribution 
comprise natural monopoly segments of the industry because competition in these parts would 
result in duplication of the existing network. On the other hand, generation and supply 
functions have nothing to do with monopoly characteristics and therefore may be open to 
competition. However, historically, electricity industry as a whole was taken to be a natural 
monopoly, and legal monopoly model was adopted assuming that it is the most efficient one. 
In general, as mentioned above, power industry was organized and operated under one of two 
basic structures: as state-owned enterprises under government control or as privately owned 
regulated monopolies (Sioshansi, 2006a). Many countries (e.g. most of the European 
countries) consolidated and nationalised their electricity industries into state-owned, legal 
monopolies while some other countries (e.g. Japan, US, Germany, Hong Kong) created 
private but regulated monopolies. So, over the last century, a large number of vertically 
integrated power companies, whether state or privately owned, have emerged under both 
models around the world, dominating the business. 
 
By the 1980s, a number of political, financial and technical factors converged and started to 
undermine the logic that electricity industry should be handled via a vertically integrated (and 
usually state-owned) monopoly (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). Among these factors, there 
were ideological reasons2, development of gas-fired combined cycle gas turbines3
                                                 
2 In the United Kingdom, for example, privatization of state owned electricity utility reinforced the ideology of 
the Thatcher government and its interest in reducing the costs of domestic coal subsidies. Similar ideological and 
political explanations can be found from Norway to New Zealand. (HOGAN, W. W. 2002. Electricity Market 
Restructuring: Reforms of Reforms. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 21, 103-132.) 
 (CCGTs), 
improvement in information and communication technologies, questions about the efficiency 
of vertically integrated utilities (whether publicly owned or regulated by public) and poor 
performance of existing utilities especially in developing countries. However, electricity 
reform in most developing countries was a fundamentally different undertaking from the 
reform in developed countries in terms of motivations, sector conditions, and institutional 
context. In developed countries, the main targets of the reform has been the improvement in 
the economic efficiency of the sector; encouragement of inter-regional (or cross border) trade, 
transferring investment risks to the private sector and offering customer choice. Other 
3 The advent of highly efficient CCGTs made it possible to build small units in relatively short time with little 
risk, which eliminated the significant barriers that had previously existed to entry in power generation. 
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subsidiary motives include the demonstration effects of the pioneering reforms of the power 
sectors in UK and Norway in the early 1990s; and rapid changes in technology especially in 
the generation of electricity that made new industrial structures possible; the desire to 
overcome what might be called sub-optimal regulation; and the policy objective to eliminate 
tendency to over-invest (so called “gold-plating”). On the other hand, in developing countries, 
motivation for reform includes the poor performance of state-run electricity operators in terms 
of high costs, inadequate expansion of access to electricity services and unreliable supply; the 
inability of the public sector to meet the investment and maintenance costs of the electricity 
industry associated with the increasing demands for power resulting from economic 
development; the need to remove the burden of price subsidies (so as to release resources for 
other areas of public expenditure), low service quality, low collection rates, high network 
losses; the desire to raise immediate revenue for the government through the sale of state 
assets; the policy to attract foreign direct investment in power sector; and encouragement of 
reform by international financial organizations and donor agencies such as the IMF and 
World Bank (Zhang et al., 2008). Besides, electricity reform in developed countries rested on 
the robust legal and institutional foundations of highly functional national political systems 
and aimed at optimizing the economic performance of an already well-developed industry. By 
contrast, in developing countries, reform took place within problematic legal and institutional 
contexts. Even, definition of success differs between developed and developing countries. In 
developed countries success of the reform depends mainly on how well the reformed 
electricity markets function; while in developing countries success usually means attracting 
capital from outside the country. 
 
In addition to internal factors mentioned above, some factors external to the power sector also 
played a major role. The most important of these factors was finance. The oil shocks of the 
1970s caused serious economic crisis in developing countries and resulted in an increase in 
foreign debt, budget shortfalls, and inflation. These crises led governments to put into practice 
structural adjustment programs with the aim of reducing public spending and increasing 
private investment into the economy. In addition to other sectors, these reforms also focused 
on liberalizing the energy industries. State industries such as electricity, gas, oil and mining 
were featured as having the greatest potential for revenue generation through 
commercialization and privatization. To sum up, both internal and external factors influenced 
the thinking of policy makers and economists, forcing them to question their long-held 
beliefs. As suggested by Sioshansi (2006a), Dubash (2003) and Reddy (2002), this was a true 
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paradigm shift. This shift has also been strongly encouraged by the World Bank, IMF and 
other international financial institutions. In 1992, the World Bank officially changed its 
lending policy for electricity development from traditional project lending to policy lending. 
That is, any country borrowing from the Bank on power projects would have to agree to move 
away from a “single national electricity utility as a public monopoly” and adopt ownership, 
structural and regulatory reforms (Yi-chong, 2006). Other international financial institutions, 
such as the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
and the Inter-American Development Bank have followed suit (Williams and Ghanadan, 
2006).  
 
The power sector reform began in Chile in 1982, which then spread through various countries 
in the world especially after the 1990s. Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) argue that the process 
of a full reform program consists of the following four main stages: (a) formation and 
approval of a power policy by government that provides political commitment needed to 
sustain the reform process, followed by the enactment of legislation necessary for 
implementing this policy; (b) development of a transparent regulatory framework for the 
electricity market; (c) unbundling of the integrated structure of the power supply into 
generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities and establishing a market in which 
electricity is traded; and (d) divestiture of the state’s ownership at least in most of the 
electricity generation and distribution segments of the market. So, key elements of a reform, 
in the suggested order, are: (i) regulation, (ii) restructuring, and (iii) where possible, 
privatization (Jamasb, 2006). However, by no means all countries have adopted all of these 
changes; indeed, in most countries state ownership remains dominant, regulation remains 
largely untested, and competition is still restricted (Zhang et al., 2005). Moreover, in many 
cases, the initial market design had inherent flaws that only became apparent after the passage 
of some time. In nearly all these cases, initial market reform resulted in unintended 
consequences, which have been addressed in subsequent “reform of the reforms” (Defeuilley, 
2009). In some instances, second and third waves of reforms have been initiated to address 
issues overlooked in the initial reform programmes. Today, reforms are ongoing in many 
countries and reform process in the power sector is regarded as not only possible and 
necessary, but also inevitable. In most reforming countries, we now have hybrid power 
markets with elements from both the old and new industry models. 
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4.3. Literature review 
 
In this section, we review empirical literature on the impact of electricity sector reform 
process on electricity prices. There is an extensive volume of literature on electricity market 
reforms but most of it is in the form of opinion and discussion without any empirical analysis. 
In line with our objectives and following Pollitt (2009b), we focus only on those studies 
which aim at revealing the relationship between power market reforms and electricity prices 
by analysing cross-country data or developing a logical framework to evaluate cross-country 
evidence. 
 
Steiner (2001) carried out the first study focusing on the effect of electricity market reform on 
final electricity prices. She studied the effect of regulatory reforms on the retail prices for 
large industrial customers as well as the ratio of industrial price to residential price, using 
panel data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1986-1996. In her analysis, she used 
electricity price, ratio of industrial to residential electricity price, capacity utilization rate and 
reserve margin as variables. The study found that electricity market reforms generally induced 
a decline in the industrial price and an increase in the price differential between industrial 
customers and residential customers, indicating that industrial customers benefit more from 
the reform. She also found that unbundling is not associated with lower prices but is 
associated with a lower industrial to residential price ratio and higher capacity utilization rates 
and lower reserve margins. Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) also examined the impact of the 
regulatory reforms on prices in the electricity industry. Like Steiner (2001), they used panel 
data for 19 OECD countries but for the period 1987-1999. They found, first, that expanded 
retail access is likely to lower industrial price, while at the same time increasing the price 
differential between industrial and household customers. Additionally, they concluded that 
unbundling of generation did not necessarily lower the price and may have possibly resulted 
in higher prices. Like Steiner (2001), their estimation showed that the effect of unbundling on 
the level of industrial price is statistically insignificant. Besides, they found that introduction 
of a wholesale power market did not necessarily lower the price, and may indeed had resulted 
in a higher price. Their estimates showed, without exception, that establishing a wholesale 
power market resulted in statistically significantly higher prices and also increased the ratio of 
industrial price to household price, although not in a statistically significant manner. 
Furthermore, they detected that a large share of private ownership lowers the industrial price 
but may not alter the price ratio between industrial and household customers.  
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Pollitt (2009b) mentions two other empirical studies that examine the price impacts of reform 
by Ernst & Young (2006) and Thomas (2006a). Ernst & Young (2006) prepared a report for 
the UK government’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In their study, they used a 
sample of EU-15 countries and tried to produce some policy suggestions for electricity and 
gas industries with a large number of simple regressions. As a result of their study, they 
concluded that liberalization lowers prices; liberalization lowers costs and price-cost margins; 
and liberalized markets increase price volatility. Thomas (2006a) examined a number of 
reports including those of European Commission which look at (or comment on) electricity 
prices. Although these studies, he argued, suggest that reforms in the EU have been associated 
with lower prices for consumers, the evidence does not support these assertions. The price 
reductions, he continued, that have occurred in the past decade took place mostly in the period 
1995-2000, before liberalization was effective in most of the European Union and since then, 
prices have risen steeply, in many cases wiping out the gains of the earlier period. For him, 
other factors, not properly accounted for, such as fossil fuel price movements, technological 
innovations and changes to regulatory practices were more likely to have led to the price 
reductions that occurred in the period 1995-2000 than reforms that had not then taken effect. 
He also underlined that the EU reform model’s real test is whether it can deliver timely 
investment to meet the emerging investment gap following the elimination of short run 
inefficiency and initially high reserve margins.  
 
Fiorio et al. (2007) questioned the widespread beliefs that public ownership can be an 
impediment to other reforms and that it leads to production inefficiency. To test for this and 
the reform paradigm in general, they considered electricity prices and survey data on 
consumer satisfaction in the EU-15. Their empirical findings rejected the prediction that 
privatization leads to lower prices, or to increased consumer satisfaction. They also found that 
country specific features tend to have a high explanatory power, and the progress toward the 
reform paradigm is not systematically associated with lower prices and higher consumer 
satisfaction. 
 
Zhang et al. (2008) provided an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization and 
competition on residential and industrial electricity prices. They used data on 51 LDCs (Least 
Developed Countries) covering 1985-2000 period. In their study, the estimated coefficients 
are not significant for privatisation, and there is only partial support for the hypothesis that 
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competition will lower industrial prices. Moreover, their results do not support the hypothesis 
that regulation will raise prices to domestic consumers. 
 
Other two studies on econometric modelling of electricity market reforms come from two 
papers by Nagayama (2009, 2007). Nagayama (2007) used panel data for 83 countries 
covering the period 1985-2002 to examine how each policy instrument of the reform 
measures influenced electricity prices for countries in Latin America, the former Soviet 
Union, and Eastern Europe. The study found that variables such as entry of independent 
power producers (IPP), unbundling of generation and transmission, establishment of a 
regulatory agency, and the introduction of a wholesale spot market have had a variety of 
impacts on electricity prices, some of which were not always consistent with expected results. 
The research findings suggested that neither unbundling nor introduction of a wholesale pool 
market on their own necessarily reduces the electricity prices. In fact, contrary to 
expectations, there was a tendency for the prices to rise. He argued, however, coexistent with 
an independent regulator, unbundling may work to reduce electricity prices. He found that 
privatization, the introduction of foreign IPP and retail competition lower electricity prices in 
some regions, but not in all regions. In his second paper, Nagayama (2009) aimed at 
clarifying whether the effects of power sector reforms should be different either across 
regions, or between developing and developed countries. He analyzed an empirical model to 
observe the impact of power prices on the selection of a liberalization model in the power 
sector. This was achieved by the use of ordered response, fixed effect and random effect 
models. An instrument variable technique was also used to estimate the impact of the 
liberalization model on the power price. These econometric models were designed using 
panel data from 78 countries in four regions (developed countries, Asian developing 
countries, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and Latin America) for the period 
from 1985 to 2003. The research findings suggested that higher electricity prices are one of 
the driving forces for governments to adopt liberalization models. However, the development 
of liberalization models in the power sector does not necessarily reduce electricity prices. In 
fact, contrary to expectations, the study found that there was a tendency for the prices to rise 
in every market model. 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of previous econometric studies on the relationship between 
power market reforms and electricity prices. 
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Table 1. Summary of previous econometric studies on the relationship between power market reforms and electricity prices 
 
Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Control Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Data samples and 
sources 
(Steiner, 2001) H: Regulation and 
restructuring leads to 
lower industrial electricity 
prices and 
industrial/residential price 
ratio. 
* Industrial end-user price in 
PPPs 
* Ratio of industrial to 
residential prices in PPPs 
* Time to liberalisation (years) 
[significantly positive for prices] 
* Time to privatisation (years) 
[insignificant for prices] 
* Unbundling of generation from 
transmission (multi-level indicator) 
[insignificant for prices] 
* Private ownership (multi-level 
indicator) 
[significantly positive for prices] 
* Third party access (dummy) 
[insignificant for prices and for 
efficiency measures] 
* Wholesale pool (dummy) 
[significantly negative for prices] 
* Choice threshold 
* Price regulation 
* GDP (US$) 
[insignificant] 
* Hydro share in generation 
[significant for prices] 
* Nuclear share in generation 
* Preference against nuclear 
technology 
* Preference in favour of coal 
technology 
* Urbanisation 
* Panel data from 
IEA/OECD and other 
sources covering 19 
OECD countries from 
1986-1996 (number of 
observations: 209) 
Hattori and 
Tsutsui (2004) 
H1: Unbundling of 
generation from 
transmission, third party 
access, the existence of a 
* Industrial end-user price in 
PPPs 
* Ratio of industrial to 
residential prices in PPPs 
* Wholesale pool (dummy) 
[significantly positive for prices] 
* Third party access (dummy) 
[significantly negative for prices] 
* GDP (US$ PPP) 
[statistically significantly 
negative for prices] 
* Share of hydro capacity 
* Panel dataset of 19 
OECD countries for the 
period 1987-1999 
(number of observations: 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Control Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Data samples and 
sources 
wholesale market, and 
privatisation leads to 
lower industrial electricity 
prices and 
industrial/residential price 
ratios.  
H2: As the start of 
liberalisation and 
privatisation approaches 
prices decrease. 
* Private ownership (multi-level 
indicator) 
[significantly negative for prices] 
* Time to privatisation (years) 
[statistically insignificant] 
[statistically insignificant] 
* Share of nuclear capacity 
[statistically insignificant] 
232) 
Ernst & Young 
(2006) 
H1: Liberalisation lowers 
prices. 
H2: Liberalization lowers 
costs and price-cost 
margins. 
H3: Liberalised markets 
drive price volatility. 
* Industrial and commercial 
electricity prices 
* The degree of market opening 
[statistically significant] 
* The percentage of market not 
covered by the three largest 
companies 
[statistically significant] 
* Composite indicator of competition 
combining the above indicators 
[statistically significant] 
 * EU-15 countries from 
1985-1991, pooled cross-
sectional six-monthly 
time-series 
* Source: EuroStat, UK 
Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) 
Fiorio et al. (2007) H: Electricity prices are 
affected by regulatory 
variables, such as vertical 
integration, public 
* Household (net of taxes) 
electricity prices 
* Consumers’ satisfaction on 
prices they pay 
* Vertical integration 
[rather small and not statistically 
significant] 
* Public ownership 
* Production costs 
[statistically significant] 
* Residential consumption 
* Efficiency losses 
* EU-15 countries from 
1978-2005 
* Consumer satisfaction 
survey data from 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Control Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Data samples and 
sources 
ownership and entry 
regulation. 
[rather small and not statistically 
significant] 
* Entry regulation 
[rather small and not statistically 
significant] 
* GDP 
[statistically significant] 
* Population 
[statistically significant] 
* Imports 
* Type of energy source 
Eurobarometer survey for 
years 2000, 2002 and 
2004 
* Source: Eurobarometer, 
OECD/REGREF 
indicators, IEA, EuroStat 
Nagayama (2007) H: Introduction of each 
reform step is expected to 
lower the electricity price. 
* Residential electricity prices 
in US$ PPP 
* Industrial electricity prices in 
US$ PPP 
* Introduction of foreign IPP 
[statistically significant for some 
regions] 
* Privatization 
[statistically significant for some 
regions] 
* Unbundling 
[not statistically significant] 
* Establishment of regulatory 
institution 
* Introduction of wholesale spot 
market/power exchange 
[not statistically significant] 
* Introduction of retail competition 
[statistically significant for some 
regions] 
* Per-capita GDP 
* T&D loss 
* The political democratic 
degree index 
* The import energy impact 
variable 
* Share of hydropower 
* Share of nuclear power 
* Panel data for 83 
countries during the 
period from 1985 to 2002 
* Regions: Latin 
America, the former 
Soviet Union, and 
Eastern Europe 
* Source: IEA, 
MERALCO 
(Philippines), CEB (Sri 
Lanka), EVN (Vietnam), 
PLN (Indonesia), 
National Statistics Bureau 
(China), OLADE, EBRD, 
various government 
information sources 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Control Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Data samples and 
sources 
(Zhang et al., 
2008) 
H1: Competition leads to 
higher residential and 
lower industrial prices. 
H2: Regulation leads to 
higher residential prices. 
* Residential prices in US$ 
* Industrial prices in US$ 
* Competition (for H1): existence of 
wholesale market (dummy) 
[this is significant for industrial 
prices for only one of the specified 
equations (at 1% level of 
significance)] 
* Regulation (for H2) : existence of 
independent regulatory agency 
(dummy) 
[insignificant] 
* GDP per capita (US$ 95) 
[significant at the 1% level] 
* urban population as % of 
total 
[significant at the 1% level] 
* industrial output as % of 
GDP 
[significance varies across 
models] 
* degree of economic freedom 
(based on 10-point indices in 
“Economic Freedom of the 
World: 2002 Annual Report”) 
[significant at the 1% level] 
* 51 LDCs from 1985-
2000 
* Generation and capacity 
data: APERC database 
and World Development 
Indicators 
* Labour: Industrial 
Statistics Yearbook, 
International Labour 
Organisation 
* Privatisation, 
regulation, and 
competition: The 
Yearbook of 
Privatisation, EIA, WEC, 
and APERC 
* Price: OLADE, OECD 
Nagayama (2009) H1: As the electric power 
price level increases, it is 
expected that the 
electricity sector will be 
more liberalized and the 
political movements that 
encourage lower electric 
* Liberalization model (in 
Model 1) 
* Residential electricity prices  
in US$ PPP (in Model 2) 
* Industrial electricity prices in 
US$ PPP (in Model 2) 
* Residential electricity prices  in 
US$ PPP (in Model 1) 
[statistically significant positive 
effect] 
* Industrial electricity prices in US$ 
PPP (in Model 1) 
[statistically significant positive 
* GDP per Capita (1995 
prices) 
[statistically significant 
positive effect] 
* Panel data from 78 
countries in four regions 
(developed countries, 
Asian developing 
countries, the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, and Latin 
 52 
Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Control Variable(s) 
[Result] 
Data samples and 
sources 
power prices will 
increase. 
effect] 
* Liberalization model (in Model 2) 
* Political democratic degree index 
(in Model 2) 
America) for the period 
from 1985 to 2003 
* Source: IEA, 
MERALCO 
(Philippines), CEB (Sri 
Lanka), EVN (Vietnam), 
PLN (Indonesia), 
National Statistics Bureau 
(China), OLADE, EBRD, 
World Bank 
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4.4. Methodology 
 
4.4.1. Indicators, their measurement and causal relationships among them 
 
As underlined by Jamasb et al. (2004), there is a lack of generally accepted and measured 
indicators for monitoring the progress, impacts, and performance of electricity sector reforms. 
Since the aim of this paper is to propose a framework for analysing the impact of the power 
market reforms on convergence towards the average electricity price-cost margin and on 
cross-subsidy levels between consumer groups, we face with the same problem. That is, we 
need to, first, evaluate possible impact of reforms on convergence towards the average price-
cost margin and on cross-subsidy levels between consumer groups; second, decide which 
indicators to use in our study and; finally, specify methods to measure them. Let me focus on 
these tasks one by one. 
 
First of all, an accurate study of reform requires an analysis of its impact on the variables we 
are interested in. As suggested by Jamasb et al. (2004), the expected direction of price 
changes as a result of reforms in developed and developing countries are often different. In 
many developing countries, residential customers are subsidised by industrial users while the 
reverse holds in some developed countries. Consequently, the expected direction of price 
changes from reform depends on the starting point. By introducing cost-reflective pricing, 
improving efficiency (and, thereby, reducing costs) in the sector; however, the reforms are 
expected not only to make electricity price-cost margins converge towards the average but 
also to reduce cross-subsidy levels between consumer groups in both developed and 
developing countries. Therefore, in this study, we check whether reforms really cause 
electricity price-cost margins to move towards the average value and cross-subsidy levels to 
go down. 
 
Second, to carry out the analysis suggested above, we need to decide on the indicators to be 
used in the study. Since we are interested in the impact of the power market reforms on 
convergence towards the average electricity price-cost margin and on cross-subsidy levels 
between consumer groups, we need three main variables: (i) a variable representing the 
convergence towards average electricity price-cost margin, (ii) another variable for cross-
subsidy levels between consumer groups, (iii) a third variable showing the scale and intensity 
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of the reform. In addition to these core variables, we also utilize a set of control variables 
(electricity consumption, transmission and distribution losses and income level), which are 
assumed to be endogenous to reform process and explain a portion of the variations in both 
convergence towards the average electricity price-cost margin and cross-subsidy levels. 
However, since our focus is on the causal relationship among main variables, we do not 
expect or suggest a specific type of relationship concerning control variables. 
 
Final challenge we face in this study relates to the measurement of the variables. For an 
indicator to be useful it needs to be based on a clear definition and to be measurable. This is 
equally important whether it is expressed in physical, monetary or qualitative terms. In fact, 
most of the economic and industry indicators (e.g. consumption, costs, prices, income level 
and T&D losses) are measured in some form of monetary or physical unit; and therefore, easy 
to include into the study. However, the extent and scope of electricity reforms are not 
quantifiable in physical or monetary units. The main electricity reform measures, such as 
privatisation, unbundling of functions, wholesale markets and independent regulation, are 
generally established gradually and have a qualitative dimension. Accounting for these 
measures with the use of dummy variables, as is sometimes done, does not reflect extent or 
intensity. To overcome this problem, as discussed in Jamasb et al. (2004), a practical 
approach has been to construct a reform index by assigning values to commonly implemented 
steps. In this study, we adopt this approach and form a reform indicator. The further details of 
variables used in this study are provided in the following section that overviews the data. 
 
4.4.2. Econometric framework 
 
It is almost impossible to observe the real impact of power market reforms on prices without 
separating the effects of market reform from variations in fuel costs and other country specific 
features. Therefore, instead of using prices directly in our analysis, we calculate electricity 
price-fuel cost margins for each country and for each year; and use convergence of these 
margins in different countries towards their average value as dependent variable in our 
models. We specify convergence towards average electricity price-cost margin as a function 
of (i) electricity market reform score (a comparable cross-country reform indicator), (ii) a set 
of controls (electricity consumption, transmission and distribution losses and income level), 
(iii) country-specific effects (these are assumed to be exogenous and to exist independently of 
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reform process, but may explain a portion of the variation in convergence towards average 
electricity price-cost margin) and (iv) other unobserved variables that influence convergence 
towards average electricity price-cost margin. These variables are then used in panel 
regressions to assess their impact on convergence towards average electricity price-cost 
margin. In panel regressions, the exploitation of both cross-country and time-series 
dimensions of the data allows for control of country-specific effects. Apart from reform 
process, price-fuel cost margin in a specific country and year may be influenced by electricity 
consumption, income level and transmission & distribution losses. In our model, we include 
all these variables in order to isolate the effect of the reform on convergence towards average 
electricity price-cost margin. Besides, prices for industrial consumers are usually supposed to 
be more cost-reflective than prices for households. Hence, in our analysis, we make a 
distinction between industrial and residential electricity prices. In addition, one of the most 
important reform targets has been removing cross-subsidies between consumer groups and 
making prices reflect the real cost of providing electricity. Therefore, apart from electricity 
price-cost margins, we also look at the impact of power market reforms on cross-subsidy 
levels. 
 
We formulate regression equations as below to analyze the impact of electricity industry 
reform on convergence towards average electricity price-cost margin and cross-subsidy levels 
between consumer groups.  
 1
2 1
k s
it j jit p pi it
j p
Y X Z tβ β γ δ ε
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑  (1) 
In the model, i and t represent unit of observation and time period, respectively. j and p are 
indices used to differentiate between observed and unobserved variables. Xji and Zpi represent 
observed and unobserved variables, respectively. Xji includes both reform variable and control 
variables. Yit is dependent variable (that is, convergence towards average electricity price-cost 
margin and deviation from unit industrial/residential price ratio). itε is the disturbance term 
and t is time trend term. Because the Zpi variables are unobserved, there is no means of 
obtaining information about the p piZγ∑ component of the model. For convenience, we 
define a term iα , known as the unobserved effect, representing the joint impact of the Zpi 
variables on Yit. So, our model may be rewritten as follows: 
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Now, the characterization of the iα  component is crucially important in the analysis. If 
control variables are so comprehensive that they capture all relevant characteristics of the 
individual, there will be no relevant unobserved characteristics. In that case, the iα  term may 
be dropped and pooled data regression (OLS) may be used to fit the model, treating all the 
observations for all time periods as a single sample. However, since we are not sure whether 
control variables in our models capture all relevant characteristics of the countries, we cannot 
directly carry out a pooled data regression of Y on X. If we were to do so, it would generate 
an omitted variable bias. Therefore we prefer to use either a Fixed Effects (FE) or Random 
Effects (RE) regression. In FE model, the country-specific effects ( iα ) are assumed to be the 
fixed parameters to be estimated. In RE model, the country-specific effects ( iα ) are treated as 
stochastic. The fixed effect model produces consistent estimates, while the estimates obtained 
from the random effect model will be more efficient. When we look at our dataset, we see that 
there are more than 90 countries in the world where a power market reform process has been 
initiated so far (those with a reform score of one or more) but electricity price data is available 
only for 63 countries. That is, our sample is limited by data availability. Besides, electricity 
prices may or may not be country specific as in some regions there are regional electricity 
markets where prices are determined across countries. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether 
the observations in our model may be described as being a random sample from a given 
population; and cannot directly decide which regression specification (FE or RE) to use. It 
will be decided in the course of the analysis based on Hausman test. 
 
In line with our research questions, the two main hypotheses we test in this study are given 
below: 
 
Hypothesis 1. As countries take more reform steps (that is, as the market moves further 
from monopoly and closer to competition), electricity price-fuel cost margins 
in different countries tend to move towards their average value. 
Hypothesis 2. As countries introduce more and more reform steps, the cross-subsidies 
between industrial and residential consumers incline to decline. 
 
Based on our hypotheses above, we expect a negative relationship between the number of 
reform steps taken and convergence towards average electricity price-cost margin. Similarly, 
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we anticipate a negative relationship between the number of reform steps taken and absolute 
value of deviation from unit industrial/residential price ratio. 
 
4.5. Overview of data 
 
Our data set is based on a panel of 63 countries for a period beginning in 1982 and extending 
through 2009. Year 1982 is selected as the starting date for the study because at that time 
electricity market reform was initiated for the first time in Chile. The final date, 2009, 
represents the last year for which data are available at the time the research is conducted. The 
countries in our sample are determined by data availability, especially by data on electricity 
prices for residential and industrial consumers and fuel costs in electricity generation. 
Because of the missing observations, our panel is unbalanced. 
 
The variables used in the study are electricity market reform score, convergence towards the 
average price-fuel cost margin for industrial/residential consumers, absolute value of 
deviation from unit (=1) industrial/residential price ratio, electricity consumption by 
industry/households, electricity losses and income level (GDP per capita). We also divided all 
countries in our dataset into three groups (developed countries, developing countries in 
America and other developing countries) based on classification made by World Bank 
(2010a) and included a dummy variable for each group of country into our dataset. 
 
Electricity market reform score variable takes the values from 0 to 8; depending on how many 
of the following reform steps have been taken in each country and each year: (1) introduction 
of independent power producers, (2) corporatization of state-owned enterprises, (3) law for 
electricity sector liberalization, (4) introduction of unbundling, (5) establishment of electricity 
market regulator, (6) introduction of privatization of incumbents, (7) establishment of 
wholesale electricity market, and (8) choice of supplier. To build this variable, we created 8 
dummy variables for each of the reform steps mentioned above and calculated the total 
number of reform steps taken in each country and each year. Dummy variables for reform 
steps are created based on the data collected and cross-checked from various international and 
national energy regulators’ web sites4
Figure 1
. Since our panel dataset includes data on 63 countries 
for 28 years, the total number of maximum observations is 1,764 (63x28).  provides 
                                                 
4 The full list of sources from which data are obtained can be found at IERN web site (http://www.iern.net). 
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the histogram of the reform score variable showing the frequency of observations while 
Figure 2 presents the changes in reform score variable for the countries in our sample from 
1990 to 2009. 
 
Figure 1. Histogram of reform score variable 
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Figure 2. Electricity market reform scores of countries in the sample in 1990 and 2009 
0 2 4 6 8
United States
United Kingdom
Trinidad And Tobago
Taiwan (Chinese Taipei)
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Slovak Republic
Singapore
Portugal
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Korea
Japan
Italy
Israel
Ireland
Hungary
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Croatia
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
Electricity Market Reform Score
Developed Countries (32)
2009
1990
 
 60 
0 2 4 6 8
Venezuela
Uruguay
Peru
Paraguay
Panama
Nicaragua
Mexico
Jamaica
Honduras
Haiti
Guatemala
El Salvador
Ecuador
Dominican Republic
Cuba
Costa Rica
Colombia
Chile
Brazil
Bolivia
Argentina
Electricity Market Reform Score
Developing Countries in America (21)
2009
1990
 
0 2 4 6 8
Turkey
Thailand
South Africa
Russian Federation
Romania
Poland
Kazakhstan
Indonesia
India
China
Electricity Market Reform Score
Other Developing Countries (10)
2009
1990
 
When we evaluate Figure 1 and Figure 2 together, we see that during the last two decades a 
lot of countries have taken many reform steps and relatively low frequency of middle range 
(from 2 to 6) reform scores indicates that once a country starts the reform process it proceeds 
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very rapidly. On the other hand, the high frequency of lower range (0 and 1) reform scores 
implies that many countries started the reform process quite late. 
 
Data on electricity prices are obtained from International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010c) and 
Latin-American Energy Organization (OLADE, 2010). The unit of observation is current 
US$/kWh. Electricity price data are available separately for residential and industrial users 
and cover 63 countries. 
 
Fuel cost data are taken from IEA and consist of two sets of data on natural gas import costs 
(USD/MBtu) and coal import costs (USD/tonne) (IEA, 2010a, IEA, 2010b). For US, Japan 
and South Korea, we use LNG import costs as natural gas import cost data while pipeline 
import costs are used for the rest. Also, we utilized average EU natural gas pipeline import 
prices as a proxy for natural gas import costs in the countries for which the natural gas import 
cost data are not available. Coking coal is required for production of coke used in steel 
industries and steam coal is used in thermal power plants for steam production. Since we are 
concentrating on electricity generation costs in our study, we used steam coal import costs in 
our analysis. Coal data is missing for some countries in our sample too. We used average EU 
steam coal import costs as a proxy for coal import cost for Norway, Switzerland and EU 
member or candidate countries for which data are missing. For other countries with missing 
observations, we used OECD averages. As we take into account the fact that energy markets 
(including natural gas and coal markets) have been internationalized in the last two decades, 
utilization of average EU or OECD import prices as a proxy for import costs in other 
countries seems to be justified. 
 
Having collected data on end-user electricity prices and fuel import costs, we calculated price-
fuel cost margins as follows. First of all, we converted electricity prices into US$/MWh by 
multiplying prices in US$/kWh by 1,000. Then, we converted the data on fuel import costs 
into a common unit, USD/MBtu. In the conversion process, we used the equation 1 MBtu ≈ 
0.036 tonne of coal equivalent. After conversion, we weighted these two variables by both the 
output of electricity from natural gas and coal within each country and year and heat rate5
                                                 
5 The term “heat rate” refers to a power plant’s efficiency in converting fuel to electricity. Heat rate is expressed 
as the number of British thermal units (Btu) required to generate a kilowatt hour (kWh) of electricity. Lower heat 
rates are associated with more efficient power generating plants. In the literature, spark spread refers to the 
theoretical gross income of a gas-fired power plant from selling a unit of electricity, having bought the fuel 
 of 
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these two fuels. Data on electricity production from natural gas and coal are obtained from 
IEA (IEA, 2010d). For instance, if we assume that data for a specific country and a specific 
year are as follows, price-fuel cost margin for industry in this country and year is calculated 
as 82.2 US$/MWh, as shown below. 
− Electricity price for industry: 145 US$/MWh 
− Natural gas import cost: 9 USD/MBtu 
− Coal import cost: 5 USD/MBtu  
− Electricity generation from natural gas: 175 TWh 
− Electricity generation from coal: 125 TWh  
− Heat rate for gas-fired plants: 8,000 Btu/kWh (= 8000/1000 Btu/MWh)  
− Heat rate for coal-fired plants: 10,000 Btu/kWh (= 10000/1000 Btu/MWh) 
 
9*(8000 1000)*175 5*(10000 /1000)*125145 82.2
(175 125)
+
− ≈
+
 
 
In 2007, on average, 42.3% of total electricity generation came from natural gas and coal in 
our sample countries (IEA, 2010d) and in 20 of them, gas and coal were responsible for more 
than 65% of all generation. Nuclear, hydro and other renewable sources accounted for most of 
the remaining generation. Since the fuel costs in nuclear power plants and renewable 
electricity generating facilities constitute a very limited portion of the total cost, we focus 
only on the fuel cost in natural gas or coal-fired power plants where fuel costs have the largest 
share in total cost. Figure 3 shows the changes in price-fuel cost margins for industry and 
households during the last two decades in countries for which data are available. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
required to produce this unit of electricity. All other costs (operation and maintenance, capital and other financial 
costs) must be covered from the spark spread. The term dark spread refers to the similarly defined difference 
between cash streams (spread) for coal-fired power plants. In short; spark/dark spread is the difference between 
the wholesale price of electricity and the cost of the fuel used to generate it taking into account the heat rate of 
each fuel. In our study, however, we calculate price-fuel cost margin as the difference between end-user (not 
wholesale) electricity prices and fuel costs. Actually, price-fuel cost margin varies between plants using different 
fuels and may vary even between plants using the same fuels. However, for simplicity we assume a heat rate of 
10,000 Btu/kWh for coal-fired plants and 8,000 Btu/kWh for gas-fired ones (For more details see US EIA. 
2010a. Average Operating Heat Rate for Selected Energy Sources [Online]. U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat5p3.html [Accessed 30.07.2010.). 
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Figure 3. Electricity end user price-fuel cost margins in 1987 and 2007 
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Following the calculation of price-cost margins for each year and each country, we created an 
average price cost-margin series that is composed of the averages of price cost margins for 
each year. Naturally, this series is different for each year but it is the same for all countries. 
Then, by subtracting average price-cost margin series from price-cost margin series for each 
country and each year and taking the absolute value of the result, we got our convergence 
towards the average price-fuel cost margin variable. We do not distinguish between the 
distance above or below the average, for that reason, we use absolute values. Of course, this 
variable is calculated separately for industrial and residential consumers. 
 
In a situation where there is no cross-subsidy between industrial and residential consumers 
and ignoring disproportional distribution and transmission charges paid by different consumer 
groups, electricity prices for industry and households are expected to be very similar to each 
other and therefore industrial/residential price ratio turns to be very close to 1. However, due 
to cross-subsidies, industrial/residential price ratio deviates from its unit (that is, 1) value. In 
our study, we created absolute value of deviation from unit (=1) industrial/residential price 
ratio variable6
 
 to measure the size of the cross-subsidy between industrial and residential 
consumers. We do not attempt to distinguish between the directions of cross subsidy from 
industrial consumers to households and vice versa; therefore we use absolute values. We 
assume that any deviation from unit industrial/residential price ratio results in inefficiency in 
the industry. 
Data on electricity consumption and transmission & distribution losses come from IEA (IEA, 
2010e). Data on GDP per capita are obtained from World Bank (World Bank, 2010b). Table 2 
shows descriptive statistics of the variables in our analysis. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model 
 
Variables (Units) # of obs. # of countries Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Convergence towards the 
average price-fuel cost margin 
for industrial consumers 
(US$/MWh) 
1,127 54 19.41 19.00 0.02 149.43 
                                                 
6 It is equal to the absolute value of [1 - (industrial prices / residential prices)]. 
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Convergence towards the 
average price-fuel cost margin 
for households (US$/MWh) 
1,179 54 37.28 29.52 0.01 205.87 
Absolute value of deviation from 
unit (=1) industrial/residential 
price ratio 
1,428 61 0.39 0.27 0 2.86 
Total Reform Score 1,764 63 2.95 3.15 0 8 
Electricity consumption by 
industry sector (GWh) 
1,614 63 68,257 159,064 41 1,867,656 
Electricity consumption by 
households (GWh) 
1,614 63 43,490 137,925 0 1,392,241 
Electricity losses (GWh) 1,614 63 15,199 35,481 0 310,036 
Proportion of loses in total 
supply (%) 
1,614 63 11.05 7.52 0 55.87 
GDP per capita  
(current thousand US$) 
1,650 63 11.81 13.61 0.20 109.90 
 
4.6. Empirical analysis and discussion of the preliminary results 
 
Throughout our analysis, we estimated three groups of models to explain convergence 
towards the average price-fuel cost margin for industry & households and deviation from unit 
industrial/residential price ratio. Each group includes an overall model including all countries 
and other three sub-models for specific country groups7
 
. In total, we estimated 12 models. 
Since using logarithms of variables enables us to interpret coefficients easily and is an 
effective way of shrinking the distance between values, we transformed explanatory variables 
(electricity consumption, electricity losses and income level variables) into logarithmic form 
and used these new transformed variables in our models.  
                                                 
7 FE estimation results do not let us detect the differences between country groups as variables that do not vary 
over time (like dummies for separating country groups) are dropped in FE estimation. In order to observe 
possible differences between country groups, we estimate separate models for each country group. 
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We perform the empirical analysis by estimating the specification given in Equation (2) for 
each model8
Table 3
. However, as mentioned before, we cannot directly decide which regression 
specification (FE or RE) to use. Therefore, we apply Hausman test for fixed versus random 
effects in each model. To perform this test, we first estimate the fixed effects model (which is 
consistent) and store the estimates, then estimate the random-effects model (which is 
efficient) and run the test. Since we prefer 5% significance level, any p-value less than 0.05 
implies that we should reject the null hypothesis of there being no systematic difference in the 
coefficients. In short, Hausman test with a p-value up to 0.05 indicates significant differences 
in the coefficients. Therefore, in such a case, we choose fixed effects model. However, if p-
value from Hausman test is above 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of there being no 
systematic difference in the coefficients at 5% level. In such cases, Hausman test does not 
indicate significant differences in the coefficients. Therefore, we provisionally choose random 
effects. After that, we apply Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (BPLM) test for 
random effects in order to decide on using either pooled OLS or random effects in our 
analysis. This test is developed to detect the presence of random effects. In this test, the null 
hypothesis is that variances of groups are zero; that is, there is no unobserved heterogeneity, 
all groups are similar. If the null is not rejected, the pooled regression model is appropriate. 
That is, if the p-value of BPLM test is below 0.05, we reject the null, meaning that random 
effects specification is the preferred one. If it is above 0.05, we prefer pooled OLS 
specification to carry out our regression.  presents estimation results for each model, 
including estimation output, number of observations and countries included in the model 
estimation, results of Hausman and BPLM tests and preferred specifications based on these 
tests. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Throughout the paper, model estimations are carried out and cross-checked by StataSE 11.1 and Eviews 7.1. 
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Table 3. Estimation results 
 
Models 
Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
Number of  Number of  Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
(country group) countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
Model 1.1 Convergence towards the average Reform score (0-8) 0.41 0.20 2.0 0.042 54 1,087 13.69 0.0083 - - Fixed Effects 
 
price-fuel cost margin for Log of electricity consumption by industry 7.97 2.01 4.0 0.000 
       
 
industrial consumers Log of electricity losses -5.49 1.83 -3.0 0.003 
       
 
(All countries) Log of GDP per capita 1.75 1.31 1.3 0.180 
          Constant -19.18 16.81 -1.1 0.254              
Model 1.2 Convergence towards the average Reform score (0-8) -0.02 0.22 -0.1 0.941 31 664 13.42 0.0094 - - Fixed Effects 
 
price-fuel cost margin for Log of electricity consumption by industry -4.51 3.02 -1.5 0.136 
       
 
industrial consumers Log of electricity losses -6.05 2.79 -2.2 0.030 
       
 
(Developed countries) Log of GDP per capita 7.96 1.50 5.3 0.000 
           Constant 97.05 25.62 3.8 0.000               
Model 1.3 Convergence towards the average Reform score (0-8) 1.82 0.54 3.4 0.001 13 257 13.38 0.0096 - - Fixed Effects 
 
price-fuel cost margin for Log of electricity consumption by industry 20.21 3.77 5.4 0.000 
       
 
industrial consumers Log of electricity losses -10.26 3.63 -2.8 0.005 
       
 
(Developing countries in America) Log of GDP per capita -4.77 3.48 -1.4 0.172 
           Constant -83.50 40.52 -2.1 0.040               
Model 1.4 Convergence towards the average Reform score (0-8) -1.15 0.50 -2.3 0.021 10 166 4.06 0.3984 73.13 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
price-fuel cost margin for Log of electricity consumption by industry -0.76 3.53 -0.2 0.830 
       
 
industrial consumers Log of electricity losses 5.76 3.40 1.7 0.091 
       
 
(Other developing countries) Log of GDP per capita 0.65 2.28 0.3 0.775 
          Constant -20.47 19.37 -1.1 0.291              
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Model 2.1 Convergence towards the average Reform score (0-8) -1.51 0.31 -4.9 0.000 54 1,136 25.58 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
price-fuel cost margin for Log of electricity consumption by households 7.34 4.12 1.8 0.075 
       
 
residential consumers Log of electricity losses 5.35 3.42 1.6 0.118 
       
 
(All countries) Log of GDP per capita 7.39 2.20 3.4 0.001 
           Constant -91.31 25.41 -3.6 0.000               
Model 2.2 Convergence towards the average Reform score (0-8) -1.76 0.36 -5.0 0.000 31 712 16.66 0.0022 - - Fixed Effects 
 
price-fuel cost margin for Log of electricity consumption by households -20.24 5.71 -3.6 0.000 
       
 
residential consumers Log of electricity losses 0.76 4.24 0.2 0.857 
       
 
(Developed countries) Log of GDP per capita 27.12 2.87 9.4 0.000 
           Constant 164.93 44.39 3.7 0.000               
Model 2.3 Convergence towards the average Reform score (0-8) -1.44 0.72 -2.0 0.047 13 257 44.91 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
price-fuel cost margin for Log of electricity consumption by households 32.05 7.79 4.1 0.000 
       
 
residential consumers Log of electricity losses 17.02 6.67 2.6 0.011 
       
 
(Developing countries in America) Log of GDP per capita -29.04 4.84 -6.0 0.000 
           Constant -366.98 49.12 -7.5 0.000               
Model 2.4 Convergence towards the average Reform score (0-8) -4.65 0.69 -6.7 0.000 10 167 24.30 0.0001 - - Fixed Effects 
 
price-fuel cost margin for Log of electricity consumption by households 50.79 8.17 6.2 0.000 
       
 
residential consumers Log of electricity losses -20.59 7.46 -2.8 0.006 
       
 
(Other developing countries) Log of GDP per capita -7.65 4.36 -1.8 0.081 
           Constant -242.35 33.04 -7.3 0.000               
Model 3.1 Absolute value of deviation Reform score (0-8) -0.01 0.00 -4.0 0.000 61 1,364 7.80 0.0993 1121.76 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
from unit (=1) industrial/residential Log of electricity consumption by industry -0.03 0.02 -1.3 0.204 
       
 
price ratio  Log of electricity consumption by households 0.07 0.03 2.6 0.010 
       
 
(All countries) Electricity losses in total supply (%, 0-100) 0.00 0.00 -1.4 0.163 
           Constant 0.12 0.12 1.0 0.312               
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Model 3.2 Absolute value of deviation Reform score (0-8) 0.00 0.00 0.6 0.558 31 687 8.88 0.0641 930.25 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
from unit (=1) industrial/residential Log of electricity consumption by industry -0.05 0.03 -1.6 0.116 
       
 
price ratio  Log of electricity consumption by households 0.07 0.03 2.5 0.014 
       
 
(Developed countries) Electricity losses in total supply (%, 0-100) -0.02 0.00 -4.2 0.000 
           Constant 0.31 0.14 2.2 0.028               
Model 3.3 Absolute value of deviation Reform score (0-8) -0.03 0.01 -5.5 0.000 21 520 9.22 0.0559 155.76 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
from unit (=1) industrial/residential Log of electricity consumption by industry -0.01 0.04 -0.2 0.843 
       
 
price ratio  Log of electricity consumption by households 0.08 0.04 2.0 0.047 
       
 
(Developing countries in America) Electricity losses in total supply (%, 0-100) 0.00 0.00 0.2 0.880 
          Constant -0.15 0.15 -1.0 0.335              
Model 3.4 Absolute value of deviation Reform score (0-8) -0.02 0.01 -2.1 0.035 9 157 18.12 0.0012 - - Fixed Effects 
 
from unit (=1) industrial/residential Log of electricity consumption by industry -0.06 0.14 -0.4 0.670 
       
 
price ratio  Log of electricity consumption by households 0.08 0.13 0.6 0.540 
       
 
(Other developing countries) Electricity losses in total supply (%, 0-100) -0.02 0.01 -1.7 0.084 
           Constant 0.49 0.61 0.8 0.425               
Note: The coefficients that are significant at 5% level are shown in bold. 
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It is not easy to draw conclusions about the impact of extensive electricity market reforms in 
various countries from empirical work that focuses on a single market or from other country-
specific anecdotal discussion of reform processes because neither type of study distinguishes 
the effects of reform from country-specific features. Therefore, our empirical approach was to 
take advantage of the diversity in electricity reform patterns in various countries and to 
control for a number of potential explanatory variables to predict three indicators: 
convergence towards the average price-fuel cost margin for households, convergence towards 
the average price-fuel cost margin for industry and absolute value of deviation from unit 
industrial/residential price ratio. Panel analysis of trends in these three indicators (using 
reform variables, country macroeconomic and other structural features) offers objective 
evidence on the observed impact of reforms at a macro level. Let me discuss the preliminary 
empirical results obtained in this study. 
 
Apart from models explaining convergence towards the average price-fuel cost margin for 
industry (especially that for developing countries in America), the signs of the coefficients for 
electricity market reform score variables are in conformity with our expectations. First of all, 
the signs of the coefficients for electricity market reform score variables in Model 1.2 and 
Model 1.4 confirm our assumptions, meaning that reform process causes price-fuel cost 
margins for industry to converge towards the average value. Although the coefficient for 
electricity market reform score variables in Model 1.4 is statistically significant at 5% level, 
this is not the case for the coefficient in Model 1.2. On the other hand, the signs of the 
coefficients for electricity market reform score variables in Model 1.1 and 1.3 are in conflict 
with our assumptions and both coefficients are statistically significant at 5% level. This result 
implies that, especially in developing countries in America, reform process causes price-fuel 
cost margins for industry to move further away from the average. In all models in the second 
group, the relationship between reform score and convergence towards the average price-fuel 
cost margin seems to be both negative and statistically significant at 5% level. This result 
suggests that convergence towards the average price-fuel cost margin for households 
increases with reform process. Besides, our results suggest that there is a negative relationship 
between absolute value of deviation from unit (=1) industrial/residential price ratio and 
reform score variable, meaning that as countries (especially developing ones) take more 
reform steps the size of cross subsidy between these two consumer groups tends to decline. 
So, our empirical findings support the idea that, by removing cross-subsidies, reform process 
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moves the industry to a more efficient state in which prices reflect the true cost of supplying 
electricity to consumers. 
 
Our analysis reveals that electricity market reform score and convergence towards the average 
price-fuel cost margin do not have a uniform relationship for industrial users, meaning that a 
move from monopoly to competitive electricity market causes price-fuel cost margins in 
developing countries in America to move far away from the average value while it has the 
opposite effect in developed and other developing countries. Although we detect varying 
relationships between reform score and convergence towards the average price-fuel cost 
margin variables in the models for industrial users, this is not the case in those for households. 
Our study clearly shows that reform process triggers a move towards the average for 
residential price-fuel cost margins in both developed and developing countries.  
 
It should also be mentioned that reform score variables have relatively weaker impact 
compared to other variables in all models. Based on our results, we may argue that electricity 
consumption, income level and network losses are more influential in explaining price-cost 
margins and cross-subsidy levels than reform process. 
 
Our findings point out a negative relationship between electricity consumption and 
convergence towards the average price-fuel cost margin in developed countries (see Models 
1.2 and 2.2), implying that as electricity consumption increases price-cost margins tend to 
move towards the average in developed countries. On the other hand, the opposite holds true 
in developing countries (see Models 1.3, 2.3 and 2.4); that is, increased consumption seems to 
result in a move away from the average for price-cost margins in developing countries. 
Moreover, we found that cross-subsidy level has a negative correlation with industrial 
electricity consumption and a positive one with residential electricity consumption. An 
increase in industrial consumption seems to result in a decline in cross-subsidies while a rise 
in electricity consumption by households causes cross-subsidies to increase. In addition, we 
could not detect an explicit pattern for the impact of electricity losses and income level on 
convergence towards the average price-fuel cost margin and cross-subsidy levels. Finally, we 
see that country specific features tend to have a high power in explaining convergence 
towards the average price-fuel cost margin and cross-subsidy levels. 
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To sum up, based on our results, we reject Hypothesis 1 only for industrial consumers in 
developing countries in America and fail to reject it for all residential consumers and 
industrial consumers in developed and other developing countries. Besides, we fail to reject 
Hypothesis 2 for all countries and consumer groups. Overall, our results reveal that the 
progress toward the electricity market reform is associated with convergence towards the 
average price-fuel cost margin. However, although our conclusion verifies the idea that 
electricity market reform process (with privatisation, liberalisation and vertical disintegration) 
makes price-fuel cost margins in different countries converge towards their average, it does 
not necessarily involve a judgement on the overall success of the reform process. The 
convergence towards the average price-fuel cost margin is just one of the expectations from 
the reform and the process should be judged based on its overall impact (not only its impact 
on price-cost margins). What’s more, it may well be argued that the reform process has just 
started or is still under progress in many countries and today it is too early to measure its 
impact on price-cost margins. These and similar arguments can not be rejected straight away. 
Today, what we may argue correctly is that, as a result of reforms, price-fuel cost margins in 
different countries have so far tended to converge towards their average value and cross-
subsidies between residential and industrial consumers have declined. 
 
4.7. Limitations of the study 
 
The research may have a number of limitations that we acknowledge. In fact, we have no 
reason to believe that any of these limitations should be existent in our analysis, but cannot of 
course rule them out. 
 
To begin with, like all other econometric studies on electricity reform, the issue of 
endogeneity may be raised in our study too. In the context of electricity price-cost margins, it 
is likely that just as reform process has an effect on price-cost margins; price-cost margins can 
also affect reform decisions. Besides, some variables in our model may be endogenously 
determined. In other words, some explanatory variables in our model may influence each 
other, as well as the pattern of electricity price-cost margins. The analysis dealt to some extent 
with this potential problem by including country and year fixed effects. The country fixed 
effects control for country-specific propensities to reform and matters such as institutional 
characteristics, and year fixed effects control for any general trend in the reform of electricity 
sector. 
  73 
 
In econometrics, the method of instrumental variables (IV) is used to eliminate endogeneity 
problem. IV methods allow consistent estimation when the explanatory variables (covariates) 
are correlated with the error terms. Such correlation may occur when the dependent variable 
causes at least one of the explanatory variables (reverse causation), when there are relevant 
explanatory variables which are omitted from the model, or when the covariates are subject to 
measurement error. In such situations, ordinary regression generally produces biased and 
inconsistent estimates. However, if an instrument is available, consistent estimates may still 
be obtained. An instrument is a variable that does not itself belong in the explanatory equation 
and is correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, conditional on the other 
covariates. In linear models, there are two main requirements for using an IV: (i) the 
instrument must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, conditional on the 
other covariates, (ii) the instrument cannot be correlated with the error term in the explanatory 
equation; that is, the instrument cannot suffer from the same problem as the original 
predicting variable. In our case, for instance, it may be argued that just as electricity 
consumption has an effect on price-cost margins; price-cost margins can also affect power 
consumption levels, which may raise the issue of endogeneity. To solve the problem, we may 
instrument for electricity consumption using number of appliances consuming electricity (like 
TV, air conditions, refrigerators and so on). If the number of electrical appliances only affect 
electricity price-cost margins because they affect electricity consumption levels (holding other 
variables in the model fixed), correlation between the number of electrical appliances and 
electricity price-cost margins is evidence that electricity consumption causes changes in 
electricity price-cost margins. In addition to IV method, endogeneity may also be addressed 
by using lagged variables and dynamic modelling. However, since all these methods require 
better data we cannot employ them here. This may be, of course, an area of future research, 
but we have ignored these possibilities here due to lack of data. 
 
Second shortcoming originates again from the lack of data. Due to limited nature of our data 
set, we could not properly account for the impact of some other variables on electricity price-
cost margins like institutional characteristics, technological innovations and changes to 
regulatory practices. For instance, a possible source of bias in our study is that the model does 
not control for market power or institutional structure of the electricity industry. Besides, 
problems associated with price conversions using exchange rates tend to reduce the usefulness 
of cross-country data. 
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Some aspects of electricity reforms are not readily quantifiable in physical or monetary units. 
The main issue is that simple observation of the fact that some reform steps have been taken 
does not reflect their characteristics and extent (Jamasb et al., 2004). That is to say, objective 
comparisons across countries are inherently difficult in any study and our analysis is not an 
exception. The main steps of electricity reform process are usually established progressively 
and have a qualitative dimension. Accounting for these measures with the use of dummy 
variables does not reveal their true scope or intensity. To lessen the impact of this drawback, 
we did not use individual dummy variables for reform elements in this study. Instead, we 
constructed an aggregate reform score variable that reflects extent of the reform process. 
Although such an approach seems a practical and reasonable representation of reform 
dimension, we cannot argue that we reflected all characteristics of the various reform 
processes in our study.  
 
Our sample is composed of 63 countries for which we could obtain data on all variables in our 
model. There will be sample selection bias if the countries making this data available have 
differing results for the dependent variables than those which do not make data available. 
Moreover, different countries may have different classifications and reporting conventions, so 
that observations in a given data series may not have the same meaning across all countries. 
Taken together, any measurement error and omission of explanatory variables may bias 
estimates of all coefficients in the models. However, in our study, omitted variables may be 
captured at least in part by the country-specific effects, mitigating the potential for bias.  
 
Finally, in this study, we used electricity prices in national currencies converted by IEA and 
OLADE into US$/kWh using the exchange rates to the U.S. dollar. As we know, if two 
countries have differing rates of inflation, then the relative prices of goods in the two 
countries, such as electricity, will change. The relative price of goods is linked to the 
exchange rate through the theory of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which states that the 
exchange rate between one currency and another is in equilibrium when their domestic 
purchasing powers at that rate of exchange are equivalent. Purchasing power parities take into 
account different rates of inflation among different economies and equalise the purchasing 
power of different currencies. In other words, they eliminate the differences in price levels 
between countries in the process of conversion. However, due to problematic nature of 
calculation process of PPPs, we do not use PPPs in this study. Although our approach ignores 
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the inflation in the US, it does so consistently and uniformly across countries. Therefore, it 
does not pose an important problem to our analysis.  
 
While our analysis serves as one of the first steps in assessing the impact of reform process on 
electricity price-cost margins, much work remains to be done. There is still much room for 
improvement within the models and data presented in this paper. The analysis can be 
enhanced by refining the regulatory indicators and finding a suitable proxy for market power. 
Also, a more complicated model that controls for the endogeneity might also improve 
estimates by better controlling for factors that affect electricity prices independently of reform 
process. Furthermore, as done in many other similar studies, we treated large countries like 
United States, Australia, Canada and India, in which the development of liberalization varies 
from state to state, in the same way as developing countries that came late to liberalization. 
Thus, in the future, we need to develop new methods to reflect the impact of the size and scale 
of these countries. 
 
4.8. Further development of the paper 
 
Up to here, we have presented the progress so far in the preparation of the first paper of final 
PhD thesis. Although the first paper has already been improved thanks to comments from 
various scholars, it will be further developed in the near future. First of all, we expect to get 
additional data on 10-15 countries, mostly from Asia and Africa. We contacted many national 
statistics offices and some of them stated that they would do their best to collect and send the 
data as soon as possible. We expect to get additional data within a few months. Besides, we 
continue to work on the methodology section and will try to improve the methodology by 
developing a dynamic panel data framework to provide broader information on the behaviour 
of electricity price–cost margins and its determinants. We are especially interested in dynamic 
Generalized Method of Moments (DGMM) method to analyze our dataset. Finally, when we 
complete the final version of the first paper, it will be sent to academic journals. In the review 
process, the paper is expected to be further developed based on comments from referees. 
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4.9. Conclusion 
 
The true value of electricity reform is a matter of empirical testing rather than theoretical 
debate. Opponents of the reform may point to spectacular reform failures (e.g. California 
disaster), or its advocates may try to get general conclusions from a few success stories (e.g. 
NordPool). However, what is really needed is a complete study of the impact of reforms 
within the context of a well defined model construction. Besides, today, there are data on 
electricity market reforms going back about three decades and available data start to let us 
meaningfully establish which market model and industry structure optimize social welfare. 
Within this context, this study tried to offer a macro level econometric analysis on the effects 
of reform process on convergence towards average electricity price-cost margin and cross-
subsidy levels between consumer groups. 
 
One of the main targets of power market reforms in the world has been price-cost margins. 
Throughout the study, we focused on this issue by looking at the impact of the power market 
reforms on the convergence of residential and industrial electricity price-cost margins in 
diverse countries towards their average value and on cross-subsidy levels between consumer 
groups. In the study, empirical econometric models with panel data from 63 countries 
covering the period from 1982 to 2009 were employed. We found that, in most cases, reform 
process causes price-cost margins in different countries to move towards their average value. 
Moreover, our findings confirmed that reform process makes prices more cost-reflective by 
reducing the size of cross subsidies between industrial and residential consumers. 
 
It is obvious that present econometric evidence on the impact of the reform process is quite 
limited. So, there is a definite need for continued analyses of the effect of reforms in the 
electricity industry. Much work needs to be done and there are ample opportunities for 
research in this area. In many countries, power market reform is still an on-going process, a 
fact that also underlines the need for continued and up-to-date study. We believe that panel 
datasets rather than simple cross-section models should be used in future studies, preferably 
including pre- and post-reform data. Moreover, so far, most of the studies have focused on a 
single reform element or outcome (e.g. reform steps, prices, performance, costs and so on) but 
there is a need for cross-country econometric studies measuring overall impact of the reform 
process. 
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We admit that power market reform is complex and the evidence is difficult to evaluate. We 
also recognize that it is too early to reach any concrete judgment for future policy suggestions 
based on the results from this paper and other comparable studies. An exact reckoning of the 
long-term effects of reforms will require much additional study over longer periods of time. 
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5. Second & third papers and PhD research plan 
 
Having analyzed the implications of power market reform process on the convergence 
towards average electricity price-cost margin and cross-subsidy levels between consumer 
groups, we will turn to unanswered research questions listed in Section 3 in the subsequent 
papers. The second paper will deal with other objectives of the reform process, especially 
quality of service, efficiency and investment related issues. Although we have collected most 
of the data for the empirical analysis in the second paper; we still need further data for a full 
evaluation of these issues. There is a need for additional or improved data on number of 
employees in electricity industries, investment levels, number and duration of power 
interruptions and so on. Depending on data availability, we will develop an empirical model 
and carry out our analysis. From the perspective of New Institutional Economics and related 
literature, the third paper is planned to focus on the institutional and qualitative aspects of the 
reform process and will try to find out why reforms are successful in some countries while 
they fail in others. Depending on the available data and results we obtain from the first three 
papers, we may conduct further studies. 
 
When we make sure that we answered all research questions that we proposed to answer in 
this report, we will combine all papers together and prepare the final version of the PhD 
thesis. Submission of the thesis is planned to take place around the beginning of the 9th term 
in April 2012. By the time we submit final PhD thesis, we are planning to publish all three 
papers in respected academic journals. Our target journals include Energy Policy 
(www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol), Energy Economics (www.elsevier.com/locate/eneeco), 
Energy Journal (www.iaee.org), World Bank Economic Review (wber.oxfordjournals.org), 
Applied Energy (www.elsevier.com/locate/apenergy) and Energy (www.elsevier.com/ 
locate/energy). Last few months of the PhD process is allocated to oral examination, or viva. 
Table 4 presents proposed PhD research timeline. 
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Table 4. PhD research calendar 
 
Years
Months 10 11 12 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Module 1: MP01 Quan. Res. Met.
Module 2: MP02 Qual. Res. Met.
Module 3: Mp03 Adv. Spec. Res. Met.
Module 4: MP01A Adv. Quan. Res. Met.
1st Paper: Literature review, data gathering and analysis
1st Paper: Write-up
First Year Report: Write-up and revisions
1st Paper: Submission to acad. journal(s) & review proc.
2nd Paper: Literature review
2nd Paper: Data gathering and analysis
2nd Paper: Write-up
2nd Paper: Submission to acad. journal(s) & review proc.
3rd Paper: Literature review
3rd Paper: Data gathering and analysis
3rd Paper: Write-up
3rd Paper: Submission to acad. journal(s) & review proc.
PhD Thesis Write-up & Revisions
Study on further papers
Oral Examination (Viva)
2009 2010 2011 2012
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6. Conclusion 
 
After more than two decades of experience with the implementation of reforms in electricity 
industries, it seems appropriate to move from speculation on their merits and/or drawbacks to 
testing their impact on empirical grounds. Proposed PhD study has focused/will focus on this 
issue by questioning whether competitive electricity markets result in least-cost production, 
appropriate quantity and quality of product, optimal pricing to consumers, and incentives for 
innovation. It also deals with the relationship between capabilities of the reform and 
expectations from it with a special focus on developing countries. 
 
Based on experiences in a few countries, it is generally argued that where the “textbook 
model” has been largely followed, the reform has been broadly successful; where it has not 
been followed, there have been problems (Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger, 2006). However, 
number of studies adopting a cross-country macro approach in the evaluation of reforms is 
extremely limited. Proposed PhD study tries to fill this gap by providing macro level 
empirical analysis of power market reforms. 
 
This report summarized the studies using econometric methods to analyze electricity market 
reforms. It mentioned country experiences of electricity market reforms to give the reader a 
flavour of what has been done so far. Then we outlined the research gap, research questions 
and data collection process. The main part of this report constitutes the first paper of the PhD 
study, titled “The impact of power market reforms on convergence towards the average price-
cost margin: a cross country panel data analysis”. The first paper showed that application of 
competitive market models in electricity industries makes electricity price-cost margins 
converge towards the average and prices more cost-reflective by reducing the size of cross 
subsidies between industrial and residential consumers. The second paper is expected to 
provide further results to evaluate the true success of reforms. As we mentioned before, it will 
focus on the relation between reform process and changes in quality of service, efficiency and 
investment in the industry. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Description of variables in the dataset prepared for the PhD study 
 
No Variable Name Unit or Range Description Source or Calculation Formula 
v1 Identifier 1 to 2576 Observation no - 
v2 Country No 0 to 92 - - 
v3 Country Name - - - 
v4 Country Code - - ISO 3166-1 Alpha-3 Codes 
v5 Year 1982 to 2009 - - 
v6 Developing 
Country 
0 or 1 
All non-high-income 
countries World Bank Country 
Classification v7 Developed 
Country 
All high-income 
countries 
v8 North America 
0 or 1 Dummies for regions 
US Energy Information Adm. 
Classification 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country, 
25.02.2010) 
v9 Central & South 
America 
v10 Europe 
v11 Eurasia 
v12 Africa 
v13 Asia & Oceania 
v14 Electricity Prices 
for Industry 
US$/kWh - 
IEA Online Database 
(31.01.2010), Energy Prices and 
Taxes (Edition: 2009, Quarter 4), 
End-use Prices 
 
OLADE Online Database 
(28.07.2010), Energy Statistics 
Report 
v15 Electricity Prices 
for Households 
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v16 Ratio of 
Industrial to 
Residential 
Prices 
- - v16 = v14 / v15 
v17 Gross Electricity 
Generation GWh 
Includes electricity 
used by plant 
IEA Online Database 
(20.02.2010), Electricity 
Information (Edition: 2009) 
 
US Energy Information Adm., 
Int. Energy Data and Analysis 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/inte
rnational, 20.02.2010) 
v18 Net Electricity 
Generation GWh - 
v19 Electricity 
Imports GWh - 
v20 Electricity 
Exports GWh - 
v21 Electricity 
Supplied GWh - 
v22 T&D Losses GWh - 
v23 Total Electricity 
Consumption GWh - 
v24 Electricity 
Consumption by 
Industry Sector 
GWh - 
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v25 Electricity 
Consumption by 
Households 
GWh - IEA Online Database 
(20.02.2010), Electricity 
Information (Edition: 2009) 
 
US Energy Information Adm., 
Int. Energy Data and Analysis 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/inte
rnational, 20.02.2010) 
v26 Electricity 
Consumption by 
Commercial and 
Public Services 
GWh - 
v27 Electricity 
Consumption by 
Other Sectors 
GWh - 
v28 Peak Load MW - 
IEA Online Database 
(03.02.2010), OECD Net 
Electrical Capacity 
v29 Total Electricity 
Installed 
Capacity 
MW - 
US Energy Information Adm.  
Int. Energy Data and Analysis, 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/inte
rnational, 20.02.2010) 
 
v30 Hydroelectricity 
Installed 
Capacity 
MW - 
v31 Non-Hydro 
Renewable 
Electricity 
Installed 
Capacity 
MW - 
v32 Nuclear 
Electricity 
Installed 
Capacity 
MW - US Energy Information Adm.  
Int. Energy Data and Analysis, 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/inte
rnational, 20.02.2010) 
 
v33 Thermal 
Electricity 
Installed 
Capacity 
MW - 
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v34 Nuclear 
Electricity Net 
Generation 
GWh - 
US Energy Information Adm.  
Int. Energy Data and Analysis, 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/inte
rnational, 20.02.2010) 
 
v35 Hydroelectricity 
Net Generation 
GWh - 
v36 Non-Hydro 
Renewable 
Electricity Net 
Generation  
GWh - 
v37 Thermal 
Electricity Net 
Generation 
GWh - 
v38 Proportion of 
Generation From 
Renewable 
Sources 
0 to 1 Includes big hydro 
v38 = (v35+36) /   
          (v34+35+v36+37) 
v39 Change in 
Generation from 
Renewable 
Sources 
GWh Includes big hydro v39t = (v35+36)t - (v35+36)t-1 
v40 Capacity 
Utilisation Rate 
GWh/MW - v40 = v17 / v29 
v41 Distance 
Between Actual 
and Optimal 
Reserve Margin 
- - v41 = |0.15 - [(v29 – v28)/v28]| 
v42 Plant Load 
Factor 
0 to 1 - v42 = v17/(v29*24*365) 
v43 Net Electricity 
Generation Per 
Capita 
GWh / thousand 
people  
v43 = v18 / (v76*1000) 
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v44 Installed 
Generation 
Capacity Per 
Capita 
MW / thousand 
people  
v43 = v29 / (v76*1000) 
v45 Employment in 
Electricity 
Industry 
thousand people - 
EU KLEMS Database November 
2008 (14.02.2010), 
http://www.euklems.net 
v46 
Employment in 
Utility 
(Electricity, Gas 
and Water) 
Industries 
thousand people - 
EU KLEMS Database November 
2008 (14.02.2010), 
http://www.euklems.net 
 
Eurostat Online Database 
(14.02.2010), Employment by sex, 
age groups and economic activity 
(1000) 
 
UN Online Database (14.02.2010), 
Employment by sex and industry 
branch, ISIC 2 (thousands; ILO) 
[code 4660] 
v47 Net Generation 
Per Employee in 
Electricity 
Industry 
GWh / million 
people 
- v47 = v18 / (v45/1000) 
v48 Net Generation 
Per Employee in 
Utility Industries 
GWh / million 
people 
- v48 = v18 / (v46/1000) 
  93 
v49 
Private 
Investments In 
Electricity sector 
current million 
US$ 
Data is available only 
for developing 
countries and 
European countries 
World Bank, PPI Project Database 
(15.02.2010), 
http://ppi.worldbank.org 
 
Privatization Barometer Database 
(12.03.2010), 
http://www.privatizationbarometer
.net 
v50 Self-sufficiency 
In Electricity 
- - v50 = v18 / v23 
v51 Reserve 
Capacity at 
Maximum 
Demand 
MW - v51 = v29 – v28 
v52 Per Capita CO2 
Emissions from 
Electricity 
Generation 
kg CO2/cap - IEA Online Database 
(16.02.2010), CO2 Emissions from 
Fuel Combustion (Edition: 2009) 
v53 Total Per Capita 
CO2 Emissions 
kg CO2/cap - 
v54 P->R->C 1 or 0 
Dummies for the 
sequencing of the 
reforms  
 
P: Privatization 
R: Regulation 
C: Competition 
(Wholesale) 
Collected and cross-checked by 
the author from various 
international and national web 
sites and papers 
v55 P->C->R 1 or 0 
v56 R->P->C 1 or 0 
v57 R->C->P 1 or 0 
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v58 C->P->R 1 or 0 
v59 C->R->P 1 or 0 
v60 Electricity 
Market Model 
0, 1, 2, 3 
0 - Monopoly model 
1 - Single buyer 
2 - Wholesale 
competition 
3 - Retail competition 
Collected and cross-checked by 
the author from various 
international and national web 
sites and papers 
v61 Introduction of 
Independent 
Power Producers 
(IPPs) 
1 or 0 - 
Collected and cross-checked by 
the author from various 
international and national web 
sites and papers v62 Introduction of 
Privatization 
1 or 0 - 
v63 Introduction of 
Unbundling 
1 or 0 - 
Collected and cross-checked by 
the author from various 
international and national web 
sites and papers 
v64 Establishment of 
Wholesale 
Electricity 
Market 
1 or 0 - 
v65 Establishment of 
Electricity 
Market 
Regulator 
1 or 0 - 
v66 Choice of 
Supplier 
(Industrial or 
Household) 
1 or 0 - 
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v67 Law for 
Electricity 
Sector 
Liberalization 
1 or 0 - 
v68 Corporatisation 
of State-owned 
Enterprises 
1 or 0 - 
v69 Total Reform 
Score 
1 to 8 
Sum of reform 
indicators 
v69 = v61+62+v63+v64 
          + v65+v66+v67+v68 
v70 Primary Energy 
Production 
ktoe - 
IEA Online Database 
(21.02.2010), Energy Balances 
(Edition: 2009) 
v71 Primary Energy 
Imports 
ktoe - 
v72 Primary Energy 
Exports 
ktoe - 
v73 Primary Energy 
Supply 
ktoe - 
v74 GDP per capita, 
PPP 
thousand US$ - World Bank Online Database 
(15.02.2010), World Development 
Indicators (Edition: September 
2009) 
v75 GDP, PPP billion US$ - 
v76 Population million people - 
v77 Rate of Return 
on Capital in 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water 
Industries 
- - 
EU KLEMS Database November 
2008 (14.02.2010), 
http://www.euklems.net 
v78 Energy Intensity 
of GDP 
ktoe / billion 
US$ 
- v78 = v73 / v75 
v79 Electricity 
Intensity of GDP 
GWh / billion 
US$ 
- v79 = v23 / v75 
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v80 
Third Party 
Access (TPA) to 
the Electricity 
Transmission 
Grid 
1 or 0 
0 - No TPA 
1 - Regulated or 
Negotiated TPA 
OECD International Regulation 
Database (12.03.2010), 
http://www.oecd.org 
 
Collected and cross-checked from 
various international and national 
web sites and papers.  
v81 Legal Structure 
and Security of 
Property Rights 
Index 
0 to 10 - 
Economic Freedom of the World: 
2009 Annual Report  
(http://www.freetheworld.com, 
12.03.2010) 
v82 Market Share of 
the Largest 
Generator in the 
Electricity 
Market 
0 to 100 - 
Eurostat Database 
(http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat, 
12.03.2010) 
v83 
Urban 
Population 
million people - 
World Bank Online Database 
(12.03.2010), World Development 
Indicators (Edition: September 
2009)  
v84 The Degree of 
Urbanisation 
0 to 1 - v84 = v83 / v76 
v85 The Degree of 
Industrialisation 0 to 100 
The percentage of 
industrial output as a 
share of GDP 
World Bank Online Database 
(12.03.2010), World Development 
Indicators (Edition: September 09)  
v86 Energy RD&D 
Budgets 
million US$ 
using PPP 
- 
 IEA Online Database 
(12.03.2010), RD&D Budgets  
v87 Proportion of 
Transmission 
and Distribution 
Loses in 
Electricity 
Supplied 
0 to 1 - v87 = v22 / v21 
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v88 Self-sufficiency 
in Energy 
- - v88 = v70 / v73 
v89 Proportion of 
Electricity 
Consumption by 
Industry Sector 
in Total 
Electricity 
Consumption 
0 to 1 - v89 = v24 / (v24+v25+v26+v27) 
v90 Proportion of 
Electricity 
Consumption by 
Households in 
Total Electricity 
Consumption 
0 to 1 - v90 = v25 / (v24+v25+v26+v27) 
v91 
Natural Gas 
Import Costs 
USD/MBtu 
Natural gas pipeline 
prices 
IEA Online Database 
(12.05.2010), Energy Prices and 
Taxes (Edition: 2010, Quarter 1), 
Natural Gas Import Costs 
v92 
Coal Import 
Costs 
USD/tonne - 
IEA Online Database 
(12.05.2010), Energy Prices and 
Taxes (Edition: 2010, Quarter 1), 
OECD: Coal Import Costs and 
Indices by Importing Country 
v93 
Crude Oil Import 
Costs 
USD/bbl 
Average cost of total 
crude imports 
IEA Online Database 
(12.05.2010), Energy Prices and 
Taxes (Edition: 2010, Quarter 1), 
Crude Oil Import Costs 
v94 
Coal Import 
Costs 
USD/Mbtu 
1 MBtu ≈ 0.0359 
tonne of coal 
equivalent 
v94 = v92 / (1/0.035999396061) 
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v95 
Crude Oil Import 
Costs 
USD/Mbtu 1 Barrel ≈ 5.8 Mbtu v95 = v93 / 5.8 
v96 
Average Fuel 
Cost 
USD/Mbtu 
Average cost of 
natural gas, coal and 
crude oil imports 
Average of v91, v94, v95 
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Appendix 2: Batch file including model estimation steps in Stata/SE 11.1 
************************************************************************ 
*                         Judge Business School                        * 
*                        University of Cambridge                       * 
*                         Stata batch (do) file                        * 
*                       for the First Year Report                      * 
*                            by Erkan Erdogdu                          * 
************************************************************************ 
 
************************************************************************ 
*  Clear previous data, set memory, load data and specify panel data   * 
************************************************************************ 
 
clear 
 
clear matrix 
 
set memory 100m 
 
use "D:\JBS\FYR\FYR_RV\dataset for the revised first year report.dta" 
 
tsset ctrno year, yearly 
 
des c_pfm_i c_pfm_r a_rirep r_scr el_c_ind el_c_res el_loses pr_loses 
gdp_pc 
 
xtsum c_pfm_i c_pfm_r a_rirep r_scr el_c_ind el_c_res el_loses pr_loses 
gdp_pc 
 
************************************************************************ 
*             Transform data and generate new variables                *  
************************************************************************ 
 
gen lgdp_pc = log(gdp_pc) 
gen lel_c_ind = log(el_c_ind) 
gen lel_c_res = log(el_c_res) 
gen lel_loses = log(el_loses) 
 
label variable lgdp_pc "Log of gdp_pc" 
label variable lel_c_ind "Log of el_c_ind" 
label variable lel_c_res "Log of el_c_res" 
label variable lel_loses "Log of el_loses" 
 
bro cntry if year==2009 & ctr_dved==1 
bro cntry if year==2009 & dving_amr==1 
bro cntry if year==2009 & dving_eaa==1 
 
xtsum c_pfm_i c_pfm_r a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res lel_loses pr_loses 
lgdp_pc 
 
************************************************************************ 
*         Estimation of FE and RE models and Hausman & BPLM tests      * 
************************************************************************ 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 1.1 (Overall) FE (H:0.0083)                      * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
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xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 1.2 (ctr_dved) FE (H:0.0094)                     * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc if ctr_dved==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc if ctr_dved==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 1.3 (dving_amr) FE (H:0.0096)                    * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_amr==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_amr==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 1.4 (dving_eaa) RE (H:0.3984, B:0.0000)          * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_eaa==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_eaa==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_i r_scr lel_c_ind lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_eaa==1, re 
 
xttest0 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 2.1 (Overall) FE (H:0.0000)                      * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_r r_scr lel_c_res lel_loses lgdp_pc, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_r r_scr lel_c_res lel_loses lgdp_pc, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 2.2 (ctr_dved) FE (H:0.0022)                     * 
************************************************************************ 
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xi: xtreg c_pfm_r r_scr lel_c_res lel_loses lgdp_pc if ctr_dved==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_r r_scr lel_c_res lel_loses lgdp_pc if ctr_dved==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 2.3 (dving_amr) FE (H:0.0000)                     * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_r r_scr lel_c_res lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_amr==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_r r_scr lel_c_res lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_amr==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 2.4 (dving_eaa) FE (H:0.0001)                    * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_r r_scr lel_c_res lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_eaa==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg c_pfm_r r_scr lel_c_res lel_loses lgdp_pc if dving_eaa==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 3.1 (Overall) RE (H:0.0993, B:0.0000)            * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses, re 
 
xttest0 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 3.2 (ctr_dved) RE (H:0.0641, B:0.0000)           * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses if ctr_dved==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses if ctr_dved==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses if ctr_dved==1, re 
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xttest0 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 3.3 (dving_amr) RE (H:0.0559, B:0.0000)          * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses if dving_amr==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses if dving_amr==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses if dving_amr==1, re 
 
xttest0 
 
************************************************************************ 
*               Model 3.4 (dving_eaa) FE (H:0.0012)                    * 
************************************************************************ 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses if dving_eaa==1, fe 
 
estimates store fixed 
 
xi: xtreg a_rirep r_scr lel_c_ind lel_c_res pr_loses if dving_eaa==1, re 
 
hausman fixed 
 
************************************************************************ 
*                            End of do file                            * 
************************************************************************ 
